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ABSTRACT 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a major catalyst for intelligence reform in 
the United States.   Since this date, most government agencies have strived to evolve and 
advance in this capacity.  One such way has been through the development of multi-
agency, multi-disciplinary intelligence centers, such as the National Counterterrorism 
Center, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, and the 72 state and 
major urban area fusion centers established throughout the nation.  However, despite the 
changes that have occurred throughout the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement 
communities, significant issues still remain that are impeding the creation and flow of 
actionable intelligence to support domestic counterterrorism efforts.  This has been 
identified from research conducted on numerous sources. Several policy, technological, 
cultural and political challenges exist, all contributing to the less-than-perfect nature of 
the United States’ existing counterterrorism framework.   
This thesis aims to identify potential solutions that leverage existing intelligence 
operations to promote an intelligence-sharing continuum across all tiers of U.S. 
government.  The author provides an analysis of specific, priority issues that require 
fixing within our nation’s counterterrorism system, and provides evidence-based 
recommendations to improve the capability and value of existing intelligence support 
structures and further-develop the desired intelligence-sharing continuum. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In the years leading up to September 11, 2001, there were serious problems with 
the way that terrorism information was exchanged amongst federal, state, and local law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies.  The 9/11 Commission honed in on this 
shortcoming and identified the need for better information-sharing practices among all 
levels of government in order to prepare for and prevent future terrorist attacks within the 
United States. The 9/11 Commission Report is filled with references that clearly 
demonstrated the Commission’s focus on issues related to information sharing and 
analysis. One such reference states that “the biggest impediment to all-source analysis—
to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots—is the human or systemic resistance to 
sharing information.”1  
Over the last 10 years, there has been a process of transformation taking place 
across the various tiers of the U.S. government in order to bolster counterterrorism efforts 
and improve the information and intelligence sharing. The impetus behind this 
transformation was the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA). The Act restructured the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and mandated 
processes to improve information sharing amongst the IC, state and local officials, and 
other critical stakeholders.  In addition, the law included several of the initiatives 
suggested in the 9/11 Commission Report.2 
Most government agencies have strived to evolve and advance in this capacity; 
one such way has been through the development of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary 
intelligence centers, such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the 72 
state and major urban area fusion centers (fusion centers) established throughout the 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 
416–417. 
2 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, 108th Cong., 
1st Sess. (December 2004). 
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nation.  Moreover, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) designated 
a Program Manager (PM ISE) responsible for the development of the Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE); more recently, the United States Congress mandated the 
creation of the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), and 
former President Bush issued the first National Strategy for Information Sharing.  Many 
of these developments are relatively new, and therefore have yet to be comprehensively 
implemented or thoroughly tested.  Despite the new models, laws, and practices that have 
emerged from recent initiatives, information processing, and sharing has improved but is 
not yet to a satisfactory level.  The October 2007 National Strategy for Homeland 
Security acknowledges this fact, as significant obstacles still remain that are affecting 
horizontal and vertical information sharing between federal, state, and local agencies.3  
Furthermore, the near success of accused terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on 
Christmas Day 2009 indicates that there is still much room for improvement. 
Some of America’s most critical assets for collecting, collating, analyzing, and 
sharing terrorism-related information and intelligence appear to be falling short of 
expectations.  The NCTC was established to be the primary government organization 
responsible for providing national coordination of foreign and domestic terrorism and 
counterterrorism analyses, intelligence production, and strategic operations.4  
Additionally, the NCTC is responsible for disseminating transnational terrorism 
information and threat analyses to the Executive Branch and for supporting the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and other 
federal agencies as they fulfill their responsibility to disseminate terrorism information to 
state and local agencies.5  While the NCTC is comprised of several IC and federal 
agencies, it has no state or local representation.  Consequently, the majority of the 
NCTC’s support has been provided to the IC and high-ranking government officials; little 
direct assistance has been provided to fusion centers, as its mission is not intended to 
                                                 
3 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C.: 
Homeland Security Council, 2007), 7.  
4 Executive Order 13354: National Counterterrorism Center, Federal Register 69, no. 169 (August 
2004). 
5 Ibid.  
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directly support state and local agencies.6  According to a 2006 self-assessment study of 
the NCTC, “methods for ensuring that homeland security and terrorism information is 
shared among non-Federal Government entities and the Federal Government remains 
inadequate.”7  This highlights the perpetual challenge of horizontal and vertical 
information sharing from this center.  At the state and local level, fusion centers are best 
positioned to distribute useful intelligence, gathered both locally and from federal 
sources, to the widest and most appropriate audience. According to DHS: 
State and major urban area fusion centers serve as primary focal points 
within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, 
and sharing of threat-related information among federal, state, local, 
tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners. Located in states and major urban 
areas throughout the country, fusion centers are uniquely situated to 
empower frontline law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency 
response, public health, and private sector security personnel to lawfully 
gather and share threat-related information.8   
Currently, gaps exist disrupting the flow of useful intelligence from the IC, and 
leaders from both fusion centers and the IC have yet to collaborate to establish a “best 
practice” for the tailoring and dissemination of terrorism related intelligence to state and 
local consumers.  As a result, the “boots on the ground,” the approximate 800,000 state 
and local police officials, and the hundreds of thousands of additional public safety and 
private sector security personnel, best suited to be the eyes and ears for counterterrorism 
support, can be left uninformed and lacking much-needed guidance regarding current 
threats.  Additionally, those agencies producing and analyzing intelligence are still—
perhaps inadvertently—acting as information silos, as the information needed by those in 
the field remains locked up behind closed doors.  
                                                 
6 Patience Wait, “Where the Data Meets the Road,” Government Computer News, August 9, 2005, 
http://www.gcn.com/print/24_25/36781-1.html (accessed March 2, 2008). 
7 National Counterterrorism Center, NCTC and Information Sharing: Five Years Since 9/11: A 
Progressive Report (Washington, D.C.: National Counterterrorism Center, 2006), 
www.nctc.gov/docs/report_card_final.pdf (accessed March 2, 2008), 10.  
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Center Fact Sheet,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/ (accessed February 12, 2011). 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What practices and processes should be implemented among state and major 
urban area fusion centers and the IC to promote an intelligence-sharing continuum and 
make fusion centers more effective in meeting the needs of their consumers? 
C. RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis aims to examine practices and processes that have to be effective in 
connecting fusion centers to both federally- and locally-derived intelligence to improve 
public safety and national security.  Furthermore, it seeks to demonstrate how national, 
state, and regional intelligence support can be leveraged to make a fusion center more 
effective in satisfying the needs of its intelligence consumers.  As such, the research 
conducted will benefit the U.S. government (all levels) and private and public sector 
entities that are consumers of and contributors to fusion center-generated intelligence.  
Homeland security practitioners and national leaders will benefit from this research 
through a greater understanding of the role state and local agencies play in our nation’s 
domestic counterterrorism efforts.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a dearth of literature related to state and local fusion centers owing to 
their relatively new emergence in the homeland security arena, which began taking shape 
shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  In contrast, literature regarding 
information-sharing deficiencies between federal agencies and state and local officials is 
vast; this comes as no surprise considering the fact that a major discovery in the 9/11 
Commission Report was related to failures in information sharing amongst all agencies 
and levels of government.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the literature can be separated into five categories:   
1. Documents written by federal, state, and local government committees to 
be used as guidelines for counterterrorism information sharing and fusion 
center processes, development, and operations.  
 5 
2. Reports written by government-sponsored agencies as evaluations of 
information sharing and fusion center development, operations, policies, 
and strategies.  
3. Congressional testimony of federal officials and fusion center 
administrators regarding the need for improved federal information-
sharing processes and practices. 
4. Transcripts of speeches by high-ranking officials regarding fusion centers 
and their role in homeland security. 
5. Articles written by academics and reporters/news media regarding 
deficiencies in information sharing, and the purpose and progress of fusion 
centers. 
1. Fusion Center Development—Past to Present 
Fusion center development began around 2003, and, initially, the few that were 
built were strictly for counterterrorism purposes. To date, 72 fusion centers have been 
established throughout the country.9  Research suggests that there is no “cookie cutter” 
approach to the development and operation of these centers; therefore, there are 
significant differences between them.10  As the evolution of fusion centers has continued, 
they have become more “crime” and “hazards” focused and structured and oriented 
according to the needs of the jurisdiction the center serves.  Some researchers believe that 
this movement is eclipsing antiterrorism information and analysis functions as more 
fusion centers focus efforts on criminal intelligence.11  
There are several events and publications that appear to have been catalysts for 
much of the recent fusion center development.  In surveys published by the National 
Governors Association (NGA) in 2005, 2006, and 2007, “developing a state intelligence 
fusion center,” and “using fusion centers for intelligence collection, analysis, 
dissemination and intelligence sharing among federal, state, and local governments,” 
                                                 
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Activities & Programs: State and Local Fusion 
Centers,” http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm (accessed March 30, 2008). 
10 Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for 
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf (accessed September 9, 2007), 19. 
11 Alice Lipowicz, “CRS: Mission Creep at Fusion Centers,” Government Computer News, July 9, 
2007, http://www.gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/44629-1.html (accessed August 10, 2007). 
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ranked among the organization’s top recommendations.12  Moreover, the Homeland 
Security Advisory Council (HSAC) recommended in 2005 that each state, “…establish 
an information center that serves as a 24/7 all source, multi-disciplinary, information 
fusion center.” This trend has continued as the years have progressed:13  
In July of 2007, the Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee stated:  
The nationwide network of fusion centers intended to gather 
counterterrorism intelligence is suffering from a lack of direction from the 
Homeland Security Department.  Because of a lack of effective federal 
leadership, however, state and local [agencies] have taken it upon 
themselves to create these centers with varying levels of success.14   
It was not until September of 2008 that minimum standards—which came in the 
form of guidelines—were created to ensure that fusion centers operated efficiently, are 
being built to interact with other fusion centers as a network, are being designed to 
sustain possible future budget deficits, or are meeting the needs of state and local 
intelligence consumers.15  Still, many have little private sector input, encounter 
difficulties with the classification of information, and have limited access to relevant 
information databases.16  Additionally, many suffer from what they consider a lack of 
actionable, specific intelligence generated from federal sources regarding threats posed to 
their jurisdictions.   
2. Fusion Center Missions and Designs 
The latest reports written by government-sponsored agencies indicate that fusion 
centers apply a variation of four primary roles and responsibilities to their respective 
missions: an orientation towards “all crimes,” an orientation towards “all hazards,” a 
combination of both, or a strictly counterterrorism focus.  Some centers are oriented 
                                                 
12 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, Fusion Centers, 18. 
13 Ibid, 19.  
14 Wilson Dizard III, “Study: Flaws in Fusion Centers,” Government Computer News, July 30, 
2007, http://www.gcn.com/print/26_19/44738-1.html?topic=state-local (accessed August 10, 2007). 
15 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, U.S. Department of Justice, Baseline Capabilities 
for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (Washington, D.C.: Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, U.S. Department of Justice, 2008). 
16 Lipowicz, “CRS: Mission Creep at Fusion Centers.” 
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towards prevention, while others are focused on response and recovery.  According to a 
July 2007 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, each fusion center’s 
interpretation of the aforementioned focus areas differs, resulting in different products 
and operations.17  Fusion centers are mostly “grassroots” establishments, and with that, 
each center’s development is dependent on the needs of the state or region in which the 
fusion center is operated.  Where each state or region has identified its own risks, threats, 
and vulnerabilities, their respective fusion center has been designed to serve functions fit 
for these identified areas.  However, it is unclear at this time whether or not those 
working at fusion centers have in fact adequately identified the most significant risks, 
threats, and vulnerabilities within their jurisdictions, or are sufficiently fulfilling their 
missions to mitigate them.18   
Evaluations and reports suggest that the vast majority of fusion centers have been 
built at the state level.  Additionally, the number of fusion centers within one state varies 
from two to eight, which has given rise to recent literature debating the practicality of 
implementing multiple centers within one state.19  Policymakers and evaluators are 
cautious about the competition for resources between same-state centers and about the 
possibility of creating multiple intelligence silos within one state due to a lack of 
information sharing.  However, research suggests the effective interaction and 
collaboration between multiple agencies and disciplines that is in practice at regional 
fusion centers appears to justify their existence within a state that already has a “state” 
fusion center.20  
E. INFORMATION SHARING 
While information-sharing strategies have improved since the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, they have not yet reached an adequate level of satisfaction amongst most 
                                                 
17 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, Fusion Centers, 19. 
18 Lehew Miller and David Carabin, “Perspectives from the Field on the 2010 Baseline 
Capabilities Assessment” (Presented at the Critical Operational Capabilities Gap Mitigation Workshop, 
Washington, D.C., August 24–25, 2010). 
19 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, Fusion Centers, 23. 
20 Ibid., 20. 
 8 
stakeholders.  Current literature illustrates a clear sentiment of dissatisfaction with the 
effectiveness of information sharing between the federal government and state and local 
officials.  During the last nine years, information sharing has been hampered by a number 
of impediments that recent legal enhancements and organizational changes have not been 
able to fix thus far.  Some of the most recognized issues are related to information 
security classifications, the absence of standards for “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) 
information, inadequate information-sharing channels, and a lack of specific and/or 
actionable intelligence products provided to state and local stakeholders from the IC.   
1. Insufficient Information-Sharing Channels 
Efforts have been made, to different degrees of success, to create Internet portals 
for sharing unclassified information between various levels of government, agencies, and 
fusion centers.  Such portals have helped bring counterterrorism and threat information to 
the computers of those working at fusion centers across the nation.  However, numerous 
sources indicate that these information-sharing portals, in their current state, have not 
provided an acceptable solution to improve information sharing. 
According to recent literature, the overabundance of information-sharing portals 
has proven to be problematic.  As stated in a testimony before the House Homeland 
Security Committee:  
What has resulted [from efforts to improve information sharing] is a wide 
variety of information sharing systems that in many cases republish the 
same information.  Having to view multiple systems is labor intensive, 
time consuming and after a period of time loses its value.21   
Analysts working at fusion centers have to log on to multiple portals each day to 
read the most recent threat reporting and gather the complete spectrum of available 
information that has been provided by various agencies in the different systems.  At a 
Congressional hearing, discontent was expressed about the fact that federal agencies have  
 
                                                 
21 Norman Beasley, “The Way Forward with Fusion Centers: Challenges and Strategies for 
Change,” Prepared Statement for U.S. Congress. House. Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, 
Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 110th Cong., 1st sess., September 27, 2007, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/092707beasley.pdf (accessed October 16, 2007). 
 9 
yet to consolidate the numerous information-sharing systems that currently exist, which is 
necessary to help streamline daily processes for gathering threat information at fusion 
centers.22  
Most agree that it is time to identify “a primary federal agency responsible for the 
reception and dissemination of terrorism-related information to and from local and state 
fusion centers.”23  The NCTC is likely best suited to facilitate this function, with the 
support of the ITACG and DHS.24 
F. LITERATURE QUALITY 
The various categories of literature specific to fusion centers provide researchers 
with a comprehensive review of what has taken place in the last nine years of fusion 
center development; however, the literature falls short in areas of future development.  
While many sources are quick to point out that fusion centers are not effectively “fusing” 
counterterrorism data as expected and that they are relying too heavily on the federal 
government for support, before 2009 very little was written to suggest strategies to 
correct these issues.  Documents existed that were viewed as a broad framework for 
fusion center development and operation; however, until recently, updates were not 
provided to show what from these documents should be standardized to ensure effective 
functions or what should or should not be implemented based on the experiences of those 
in the field. 
The CRS report, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, is one of few 
initial documents that provided direction for future fusion center development.25  This 
report suggests a national strategy for fusion centers and calls for a networked approach 
for “second generation” fusion efforts.  Additionally, it offers a variety of strategies for 
                                                 
22 Ben Bain, “Confusion Over Fusion Centers,” Federal Computer Week, October 8, 2007, 
http://fcw.com/Articles/2007/10/04/Confusion-over-fusion-centers.aspx?p=1 (accessed October 10, 2007). 
23 Kenneth Bouche, “State and Local fusion Center and the Role of DHS,” Prepared Statement 
for U.S. Congress. House. Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and 
Terrorism Risk Assessment, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/090706bouche.pdf (accessed October 16, 2007). 
24 Beasley, “The Way Forward with Fusion Centers.” 
25 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, Fusion Centers. 
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Congress to consider regarding future support to fusion centers, including 
recommendations regarding the ITACG, which is rare amongst the other documents of its 
kind.   
On the topic of information sharing, the literature conveys a message that state 
and local fusion centers are at a loss without efficient aid from a national intelligence 
support structure capable of sharing information regarding threats collected and analyzed 
from a national perspective.  While fusion centers may be in an excellent position to 
provide an effective means of sharing information with state and local stakeholders, the 
efforts will fall short without an effective process for sending and receiving information 
from the IC.  As stated in one Congressional testimony: 
The critical link in the overall National intelligence process is the agencies 
that are closest to their communities... The challenge faced by the National 
Intelligence Community is how to establish real time linkages between 
state and local agencies that allows both receiving information from and 
providing information to their fusion centers.26 
G. METHODOLOGY 
To execute the requirements of this thesis, the author used a triangulation 
methodology and analyzed various organizational structures, policies, practices, and 
initiatives to identify strengths and weaknesses based both against what they are intended 
to be doing (both independently and in coordination), and what they are actually doing. 
The triangulation methodology assists researchers in the synthesis and integration of 
multiple data and information sources for evaluation and ultimately, policy 
recommendations.27  Triangulation can make use of pre-existing data and information, 
allowing for a rapid understanding of a given situation to expedite decision-making. By 
examining information collected by different people and methods, and both qualitative 
and quantitative studies, making use of expert judgments, the resultant findings can 
corroborate each other and reduce the effect of both systematic bias and random error 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 World Health Organization, Overview of Triangulation Methodology: Synthesis of Multiple 
Data Sources for Evaluation and Decision-making in HIV Epidemics, Based on Initial Experiences, 
http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Facts_and_Figures_08Tri-Resource_Guide_Generalized.pdf (accessed 
February 12, 2011), 7–8. 
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present in a single study.28  Using triangulation can make findings more robust, as it is a 
means for combining research methods to give a range of perspectives.29  Gap analyses 
are utilized to assess an organization’s current capabilities in comparison with its 
potential and to determine what is leading to the identified disparity, or “gap.”  Gap 
analyses were used in this thesis to identify and isolate the issues that are contributing to 
inadequate intelligence production and information sharing at state and local fusion 
centers. 
Additionally, the author coordinated a Delphi panel that consisted of 22 
intelligence professionals from federal, state, local, and private sector organizations. The 
Delphi method is a structured communication process for collecting and refining 
knowledge from a group of experts by means of a series of questionnaires and controlled 
feedback; it is a technique that is often used when there is a complex problem, a lack of 
knowledge available to answer a research question, and when anonymity is necessary.30  
A total of two iterations of questionnaires were created, disseminated, and analyzed for 
the purpose of identifying problems in the national counterterrorism intelligence system 
and fixing the problems.    
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapters II and III were written to provide the reader with a background of the 
various laws, strategies, and organizational roles that combine to provide national 
security for the United States in response to the threat posed by international terrorism.  
Chapter IV gives a detailed description of the methodology used to analyze the problems 
disrupting intelligence production and sharing, while Chapters V and VI present the 
analytic findings.  The final policy recommendations are illustrated in Chapters VII and 
VII, providing the reader with prospective solutions to increase the efficiency of both 
                                                 
28 World Health Organization, Overview of Triangulation Methodology. 
29 United Nations World Food Program, Office of Evaluation and Monitoring, Choosing Methods 
and Tools for Data Collection, 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ko/mekb_module_13.pdf (accessed August 13, 
2011). 
30 Harold A. Linstone and Murray Turnoff, The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications 
(Newark, NJ: Information Systems Dept., New Jersey Institute of Technology, 2002), 
http://www.is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook (accessed January 23, 2008). 
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fusion center intelligence operations and the national intelligence sharing system of the 
federal government.  Materials and resources from the author’s research can be found in 




II. TRANSFORMATION: THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 
EVOLVING THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
A. THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, THREAT ENVIRONMENT  
On February 18, 2008, in a presentation to the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, made the 
following remarks: 
It has been six and a half years since 9/11.  More than seven years since 
the attack on the USS Cole. Almost ten years since the attacks on the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  Nearly 15 years since the first attack 
on the World Trade Center and twenty-five years since the bombing of the 
U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut.  Over that quarter-century, the 
threat we face from terrorism has constantly mutated, sometimes in 
tragically unexpected ways. This has compelled us to adapt and evolve as 
well.31 
Furthermore, Leiter went on to state, “Above all, the United States remains the 
top target for al Qa’ida’s operational commanders, who continue to look for ways to 
smuggle Western-savvy operatives into our borders, or, inspire those already here to 
act.”32 Leiter’s presentation continued to discuss, in greater depth, the threat posed to the 
U.S. by al Qa’ida, and al Qa’ida-inspired terrorist cells, as well as the protective measures 
in which the U.S. government has invested to counter this and similar threats.  As 
indicated above, 9/11 was not the first time the U.S. was affected by international 
terrorism, although it was the tipping point that lead to drastic changes in U.S. policy and 
the government’s approach to terrorism and national security.  Consequently, this new 
and evolving threat represents a major change from that of the Cold War—where much 
of U.S. military and security efforts were focused during the mid-1940s through the early 
1990s—and thus requires a far different approach to overcome it.   
                                                 
31 Michael Leiter, “Looming Challenges in the War on Terror” (Remarks Presented to the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2008), 
http://www.nctc.gov/press_room/speeches/wash-inst-written-sfr-final.pdf (accessed March 7, 2008), 1. 
32 Ibid., 7. 
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The Cold War was driven by geo-political tensions between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union, the differing political philosophies (Democracy vs. Communism) of the 
two superpowers, and a race to advance militarily, industrially, and technologically.  The 
threat posed today by international terrorism is primarily driven by a radical, Islamic 
religio-political ideology, supported by both foreign Islamic states and non-state 
sponsors, in response to the effects of Western ideologies, globalization, and a non-
Islamic “Western” presence in the Middle East.  In the former Cold War era, the threat 
was of economic challenges, military action against the U.S., nuclear proliferation and 
attacks and the end of the “free world;” whereas the threat posed today by terrorism is 
asymmetric in nature, stemming from both politically and religiously motivated networks 
of clandestine operatives and lone actors that aim to instill fear and commit acts of 
violence without warning.  Perhaps most astounding, as realized from 9/11 and 
subsequent terrorist events, is not just terrorists’ ability to carry out large-scale operations 
while evading detection, but their willingness to take their own lives while carrying out 
acts of violence to influence political and religious objectives.  
Additionally, this threat is further exacerbated by the spread of its violent 
ideology, propagating through the media, Internet, religious institutions, or conventional 
social clubs, and thus, promoting “homegrown” Islamic radicalization within the U.S. 
(now referred to as homegrown violent extremists or HVEs).  In light of this threat, U.S. 
agencies engaged in counterterrorism missions must refrain from violating the legal 
rights guaranteed to American citizens in the U.S. Constitution—particularly, the First 
and Fourth Amendments (freedom of religion, press, and expression; and provisions 
against unreasonable searches and seizures)—while aiming to suppress the proliferation 
of violent rhetoric and criminally-related extremism in the U.S.   
David Tucker, an expert in the field of terrorism, has argued two critical points 
that are highly relative to understanding the U.S. changing threat environment: terrorism 
has not necessarily changed in the years leading up to or following 9/11, rather “9/11 
changed us;” and, the attacks on 9/11 were not necessarily the result of religious 
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fanaticism but instead a violent clandestine organization’s attempt to mobilize a large, 
sympathetic population, through the use of violence, for a political purpose.33 
B. INTELLIGENCE 
One of the United States’ most critical tools for counterterrorism is the use of 
intelligence operations “to detect terrorist activity before it manifests itself in an attack so 
that proper preemptive, preventive, and protective action can be taken.”34 As realized 
from 9/11, the U.S. must engage more than just the Intelligence Community, which has 
traditionally focused intelligence efforts on international issues.  All U.S. government 
agencies and organizations—domestic and international—with the legal authority to 
administer intelligence operations must be engaged in such practices for counterterrorism 
purposes, for as we have experienced, future attacks are likely to originate within the 
U.S., rather than directly from abroad.  Mark Lowenthal, former Assistant Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, has defined intelligence as follows: 
Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information 
important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and 
provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of 
these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and 
the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.35 
David Carter, Professor of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University, has 
provided a slightly different definition of the term intelligence, suggesting a distinction 
between what intelligence means to law enforcement agencies versus its interpretation by 
the agencies that form the U.S. Intelligence Community: 
Intelligence is the product of an analytic process that evaluates 
information collected from diverse sources, integrates the relevant 
information into a cohesive package, and produces a conclusion or 
estimate about a criminal phenomenon by using the scientific approach to 
problem solving (i.e., analysis). Intelligence, therefore, is a synergistic 
                                                 
33 David Tucker, The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security: An Overview (Video lecture, 
Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 2006). 
34 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C.: 
Office of Homeland Security, 2002), 15. 
35 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002), 9. 
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product intended to provide meaningful and trustworthy direction to law 
enforcement decision makers about complex criminality, criminal 
enterprises, criminal extremists, and terrorists.36 
Thus, for the objectives of law enforcement agencies, intelligence is “the product 
of an analytic process that provides an integrated perspective to disparate information 
about crime, crime trends, crime and security threats, and conditions associated with 
criminality.”37  Yet, in the capacity of its use by the U.S. Intelligence Community—such 
as described by Lowenthal—intelligence focuses on a much broader array of issues that 
have significance to national security and U.S. interests, ranging from military action, 
standard politics, foreign relations, and, most notably, domestic and international 
terrorism. The subtle differences in these definitions is beyond the scope of this thesis; 
however, it is important for the reader to recognize the key concept found within both 
definitions—intelligence as the outcome of a process that includes analyzing collected, 
relevant information, based on an identified need, in order to arrive at a conclusion, and, 
ultimately, provide a final “product” to influence and fortify a decision. Additionally, 
based on these different definitions of the same term, one can see that the main products 
created as a result of each may differ, as a different scope of requirements is presented by 
each. 
Intelligence is conducted and prepared through a methodology known as the 
intelligence cycle, or what Lowenthal refers to as “intelligence as process.”38  According 
to the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, “The intelligence cycle is the means 
of developing raw information into finished intelligence products for use in decision 
making and formulating policies and actions.”39 While numerous variations of the 
intelligence cycle have been expounded in academia, in the traditional sense, it is a 
process that typically consists of six primary “steps”: planning and direction, identifying 
                                                 
36 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, and Michigan State University, 2004), 7. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
38 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 9. 
39 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 
(Washington, D.C.: Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, U.S. Department of Justice, 2003), 7. 
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intelligence needs or requirements, collection, synthesis and analysis, production, 
dissemination, and feedback (see Figure 1).  Depending on the agency or individual 
administering the intelligence cycle, various steps are often combined or divided.   
Figure 1.   The Intelligence Cycle40 
Furthermore, intelligence is the byproduct of analyzed, often targeted, 
information; it results when one provides relevance and meaning to facts and indicates 




                                                 




information; it is knowledge that has been specially prepared to answer a question, verify 
a situation, or provide an understanding, in actionable terms, to an individual’s unique 
circumstances.41 
Thus, while intelligence is derived from information gathered through the 
exploitation of various sources, intelligence ultimately requires human, analytic 
involvement to add value to that which is collected and tailor a product to fit a 
consumer’s needs.  This analytic requirement of meeting the consumer’s needs is of 
significance to this thesis.  Figures 2 and 3 provide a list of intelligence collection 
disciplines, as well as a list of common intelligence product categories: 
                                                 
41 Lisa Krizan, “Intelligence Essentials for Everyone,” Occasional Paper Number Six 
(Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1999), 7. 
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Figure 2.   Intelligence Collection Disciplines42  
                                                 
42 Krizan, “Intelligence Essentials for Everyone,” 23. 
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Figure 3.   Common Intelligence Product Categories43 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM 
1. Federal Reform 
Prior to September 11, 2001, a lack of communication and collaboration existed 
amongst the agencies within the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities as 
each operated within fragmented information stovepipes.  Those responsible for the 
production of intelligence to support the U.S.’s counterterrorism efforts failed to share 
terrorism-related information rapidly and efficiently within the Intelligence Community, 
and with federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.44  This “failure” was 
indicated in the reports of both the 9/11 Commission and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Commission as a critical factor that prevented the U.S. from thwarting al Qa’ida’s 
September 11 terrorist attacks.45  As a result, efforts have been made to improve the U.S. 
government’s domestic and international intelligence composition in order to prevent 
future terrorist activity within the U.S. and upon U.S. interests.  Several laws and 
                                                 
43 Krizan, “Intelligence Essentials for Everyone,” 9. 
44 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Report to the President of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 2005), 281. 
45 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9 /11 Commission Report. 
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strategies have since been established and/or restructured, and numerous organizational 
changes have been implemented to strengthen intelligence practices at all levels of 
government.  
In response to the perceived transformation in the U.S. threat environment, former 
President George W. Bush issued the nation’s first National Strategy for Homeland 
Security in July of 2002 as a means of providing a comprehensive and shared vision for 
how to achieve the goal of protecting the U.S. from future terrorist attacks.46 The 2002 
strategy prioritized three strategic objectives, “Prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S., 
reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from 
attacks that do occur.”47  The 2002 strategy also focused U.S. homeland security 
functions into six “critical mission areas:” “intelligence and warning, border and 
transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, 
defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response,” all 
of which are significant to this thesis.48  In the eight years that followed the drafting of 
this document, several additional national strategies were drafted by the U.S. government 
to assist in the effort to combat terrorism and improve homeland security. 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) 
restructured the U.S. Intelligence Community and mandated processes to improve 
information sharing amongst the Intelligence Community, state and local officials, and 
other critical stakeholders.  The law included several of the initiatives suggested in The 
9/11 Commission Report.49  As stated by former President George W. Bush, “The many 
reforms in this act have a single goal: to ensure that the people in government responsible 
for defending America have the best possible information to make the best possible 
decisions.”50  In 2005, the National Intelligence Strategy for the United States of America 
(NIS) was drafted to provide direction for carrying out the requirements of the IRTPA 
                                                 
46 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 1. 
47 Ibid., 1. 
48 Ibid., 2. 
49 White House, “President Signs Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,” December 
17, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041217-1.html (accessed July 10, 2007). 
50 Ibid. 
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and thus overhaul the U.S. Intelligence Community.  Among the NIS’ 15 objectives, it 
aimed to change, and thus improve, the role of organizations, culture, and collaborative 
behaviors within the Intelligence Community; enhance the propensity to disseminate 
information and intelligence by embracing a “need to share” mentality; and improve 
information collection, the depth and quality of analysis, the ability to forecast potential 
problems, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and, ultimately, 
defeat terrorism.51  
Furthermore, the revised National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued in 
October 2007, identified a commitment to improve and increase the effectiveness of 
horizontal and vertical information sharing among federal, state, and local 
governments.52  According to the report: 
Such information (regarding homeland security, terrorism, and law 
enforcement) can be used by agencies from all levels of government in 
support of efforts to prevent terrorist acts; develop critical infrastructure 
protection and resilience plans; prioritize emergency management, 
response, and recovery planning activities; devise training and exercise 
programs; and determine the allocation of funding and other resources for 
homeland security-related purposes.53   
2. State and Local Reform  
Considering the current threats presented to the U.S. by both domestic and 
international terrorism, including HVEs, state and local agencies play a key role in public 
safety and national security through their routine engagement with the communities they 
serve.  State and local law enforcement and public safety agencies have been identified as 
our nation’s first line of defense against terrorism—they have been dubbed “our nation’s 
first preventers and responders”—particularly for their role in identifying terrorist activity 
and emerging terrorist plots within each agency’s respective jurisdiction and for their role 
                                                 
51 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Strategy for the United 
States of America (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005). 
52 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 12, 68. 
53 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing (Washington, D.C.: White House, 
2007), 1. 
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in responding to emergencies.54  Personnel from state and local agencies possess a wealth 
of knowledge regarding the communities they patrol, inspect, and respond to, as well as 
the businesses and people that they routinely interact with through their daily course of 
business. In contrast, federal intelligence agencies lack this “boots on the ground” 
capability within the U.S.  According to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), 
“such interaction could help in preventing a terrorist attack or aid in its investigation.”55  
This “local knowledge” provides these agencies with a significant tool for U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts; thus, the reception of relevant, timely, and actionable 
intelligence regarding pertinent terrorist threats and tactics is vital to their ability to 
effectively train, prepare, and allocate resources in order to prevent terrorist acts or 
respond accordingly.   
Furthermore, federal agencies rely on information generated at the local level to 
develop leads, open investigations, and assess threats to national security that may be 
developing domestically.  As such, communication channels are necessary to share 
information vertically between local agencies with inside knowledge of their 
communities and those working within the Intelligence Community on issues of national 
and international relevance.  Ultimately, an intelligence-sharing continuum must be 
established between all entities in our nation’s intelligence, public safety, and national 
security apparatus: from the signals analyst at the National Security Agency (NSA) to the 
State Department field officer at the London embassy; from the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) analyst working in Washington, D.C. to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) agent in Chicago; from the ambulance driver in Scottsdale, Arizona 
to the cop walking a beat in Boston, Massachusetts; from the DHS Protective Security 
Advisor in Salt Lake City, Utah to the Marriott Hotel security manager in Sacramento, 
California.  All levels of government and all entities assigned a safety and security role 
                                                 
54 Michael Chertoff, “Remarks by the Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff at the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Conference,” remarks presented to the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Conference, Boston, MA, October 16, 2006, 
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National Strategy for Information Sharing, 3. 
55 Marie Rosen, Chief Concerns: A Gathering Storm–Violent Crime in America (Washington, 
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must be kept alert to counter the threat of terrorism in the U.S., and each must function as 
our nation’s eyes and ears, within their respective legal authorities.  The national network 
of fusion centers can assist in this requirement by functioning as a critical analytic 
component and facilitator of the intelligence-sharing continuum connecting federal, state, 
local, and private sector organizations to intelligence of relevance to their respective 




III. ENHANCED INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT STRUCTURES TO 
COUNTER THE TERRORIST THREAT  
A. STATE AND MAJOR URBAN AREA FUSION CENTERS 
At the state and local level of government, the development of intelligence fusion 
centers is a relatively new trend in U.S. homeland security that began taking shape 
shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.  The 9/11 Commission 
recommended, “…unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their 
knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends traditional 
government boundaries.”56  In an effort to support this recommendation and, ultimately, 
enhance public safety and national security, fusion centers have been created within state 
and local governments to foster both collaboration and the exchange of intelligence 
between law enforcement, first responder, public health, critical infrastructure (private 
sector), and other agencies involved in public safety, homeland security, and 
counterterrorism from all levels of government.   
As stated in the Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information 
and Intelligence in a New Era, “A fusion center is an effective and efficient mechanism 
to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and 
improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by analyzing data from a variety of 
sources.”57  Additionally, the National Governors Association (NGA) Center for Best 
Practices has encouraged the development of fusion centers, indicating that they are 




                                                 
56 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9 /11 Commission Report, 400. 
57 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and 
Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era (Washington, DC: Global Justice Information Sharing 
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previously have hampered counterterrorism efforts at the state and local level.”58  As a 
result of this endorsement, fusion centers have become a major component of homeland 
security programs in nearly every state.59   
To date, a total of 72 state and major urban area fusion centers have been 
established and operate at various stages of development throughout the U.S. (see Figure 
4).60  Most centers are developing to serve as the primary hub for the collection, 
collation, analysis, production, and dissemination of information and intelligence related 
to crime, terrorist threats, and other public safety matters within their respective state or 
region.  As such, each center bears the responsibility of delivering timely, valuable 
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Figure 4.   National Network of Fusion Centers61 
For intelligence production and sharing purposes, a give-and-take relationship is 
required between each fusion center and its respective partners, as each center is expected 
to collect, collate, synthesize, and analyze information, provided from various sources, in 
order to produce intelligence products of value regarding terrorist threats, indications, and 
warnings of criminal and terrorist activity, and both tactical and strategic intelligence 
assessments to support decision making for public safety and national security.  Thus, 
operational personnel from all agencies and levels of government are expected to provide 
information of significance to the center for further integration and analysis, such as 
suspicious activity reports, self-produced intelligence reports, crime related data, and 
other classifications of data and information specifically targeted to satisfy unique 
                                                 
61 Jamison Moody, “DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis Support to State and Local 
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information needs.  Such information is intended to be used to support analytic 
assessments of criminal intent and capability, as well as the risk presented to individuals, 
critical infrastructure assets, jurisdictions, and regions of concern.   
Analyst working at each center must understand the intricacies of their respective 
areas of responsibility (i.e., critical infrastructure, hazards and vulnerabilities present; 
population densities) to effectively correlate and assess the context of a given threat 
stream and its potential application to this area (i.e., if threat “X” is implemented within 
area of responsibility “Y” by an individual/group with terrorist/criminal intent, what 
might be targeted, and how, when and where might this present the greatest risk?).  The 
resulting assessments should provide decision makers with a greater level of knowledge 
on a subject than previously held and should be disseminated to targeted audiences 
according to need and applicability in a timely manner so that appropriate actions can be 
taken to mitigate the threat or risk.  One fusion center manager summed this concept up 
well by stating, “Our intent is to develop an environment within our State in which public 
safety partners can give the fusion center a ‘quarter’, and in return the center will provide 
them with a ‘dollar.’”62 
However, questions remain as to whether or not intelligence support has been 
adequately provided from state, local, and private sector agencies and the IC alike, and if 
the necessary information conduits have been created to facilitate the essential 
information sharing.  Additionally, many have questioned the effectiveness of fusion 
centers since their initial implementation:  
• Are they working as they are intended?  
• Do they incorporate multi-discipline participation?  
• Are they providing value-added analysis by effectively implementing the 
intelligence cycle?   
• Are their products meeting the needs of their consumers?  
• And perhaps most significant: Are the 72 existing centers working 
together as a formal network by sharing information, finished analyses and  
 
                                                 
62 Raymond Guidetti (New Jersey State Police), interview with author, Monterey, CA, June 24, 
2010.  
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assessments, and knowledge in a manner that informs and prepares—and 
thus strengthens—the network, and reduces redundant efforts and the 
strain on limited resources?   
For several years following 9/11, al Qa’ida and al Qa’ida-inspired terrorist 
activity occurred in greater frequency overseas than within the U.S., as indicated by 
successful and disrupted attacks in the United Kingdom, Spain, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, India, and Algeria.  In light of this, fusion center personnel have relied on 
information and intelligence received from the Intelligence Community regarding 
patterns and trends in terrorist activity and information regarding terrorist threats, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures that have transpired abroad. This type of reporting ultimately 
influences each fusion center’s intelligence priorities, as well as each state and local 
jurisdiction’s homeland security and counterterrorism strategies. This information 
informs analytic assessments produced at fusion centers by providing greater context of 
what might transpire locally if the same tactics, techniques, and procedures are applied by 
individuals aiming to carry out similar actions. Thus, quality intelligence support from 
the Intelligence Community is a significant factor in the success of fusion centers.  In 
recent years, additional organizations have been created specifically for the analysis of 
terrorist-related activity and to help bridge the intelligence gaps that once existed between 
disparate agencies and levels of government.  
B. NCTC—THE U.S. ‘FUSION CENTER’ OF TERRORISM-RELATED 
INTELLIGENCE 
As recommended in the 9/11 Commission Report and codified in the December 
2004 IRTPA, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established to be the 
primary government organization responsible for providing national coordination of 
foreign and domestic terrorism and counterterrorism analyses, intelligence production, 
and strategic operations.63 Additionally, the center is responsible for disseminating 
transnational terrorism information and threat analyses to federal agencies with 
counterterrorism responsibilities, and the Executive Branch, in order to assist them in 
fulfilling their respective missions to protect the U.S. and its interests from terrorist 
                                                 
63 Executive Order 13354. 
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activities.64  The NCTC integrates more than 500 analysts and other personnel from more 
than 16 federal agencies for analytic intelligence production purposes, and synchronizes 
counterterrorism strategic operational planning for 22 federal departments and agencies 
for our nation’s War on Terror.65  According to the center’s director: 
The creation of NCTC was a deliberate break from the Government’s 
history of creating “stovepiped” agencies to address what were frequently 
cross-cutting problems. Terrorism involves such a range of activities and 
enablers—from propaganda campaigns to gain new recruits, to organized 
camps to train terrorists, to smuggling and drug operations to provide 
funding, to potential suicide bombers that sow fear—that to combat the 
threat requires leveraging all elements of national power.  From domestic 
intelligence and law enforcement to foreign intelligence and military 
action…[all] must work in a coordinated fashion to address the threat.66 
The NCTC was created to provide greater security for U.S. citizens, as it serves as 
our nation’s fusion center for terrorism-related information and intelligence activities.  
Analysts working within the confines of the NCTC have access to a large number of 
classified information networks and systems through which all terrorism-related 
information available to the federal government is provided to the center.67  Analysts 
leverage this central repository of terrorism information as they work collaboratively with 
their counterparts from various agencies within the Intelligence Community to produce 
tactical and strategic analytic products in support of policy development by the Executive 
Branch, and foreign and domestic field operations.  The center also hosts several daily 
secure video teleconferences to keep the Executive Branch and the Intelligence 
Community informed about terrorist activity and counterterrorism operations 
worldwide.68 
                                                 
64 Executive Order 13354. 
65 National Counterterrorism Center, “About the National Counterterrorism Center,” 
http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html (accessed August 14, 2011).  
66 Leiter, “Looming Challenges in the War on Terror,” 2. 
67 Ibid., 3. 
68 M. Scott. Mahaskey, “Scott Redd: Imagination, Collaboration Keys to Counterterrorism,” 
Federal Times, August 6, 2007, http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=2945016 (accessed August 14, 
2011). 
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The “value added” that was foreseen in the inception of the NCTC is the result of 
the various counterterrorism information streams collectively integrated and fused within 
the center, combined with the diverse subject matter expertise from individuals 
originating from numerous agencies and specialties, collocated within the center to 
complement one another.  This represents a dynamic shift from the U.S. government’s 
pre-9/11—and hence, pre-IRTPA—intelligence enterprises that focused almost 
exclusively within their own “information silos” and signifies a revolution in the way 
analysis is conducted to triumph over a common threat.  However, questions remain 
pertaining to the frequency in which analyses originating at the NCTC—or other federal 
agencies—reach a state and local audience and the degree in which the products that are 
in fact delivered are deemed “useful” or “relevant” to the daily operations of state and 
local officials. Furthermore, as an organization that is mandated to provide direct support 
only to federal agencies engaged in counterterrorism missions, how are non-federal 
agencies—particularly those at the state and local level—affected by the NCTC’s work?   
C. THE GOLDEN THREAD TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY? 
1. Information Sharing Environment 
The 2004 IRTPA included several additional requirements to enhance the U.S. 
government’s intelligence capacity.  In addition to the creation of the NCTC, the IRTPA 
required that the President “establish an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) for the 
sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national security, and with 
applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.”69 Furthermore:  
In accordance with IRTPA, the ISE will reflect the combination of 
policies, procedures and technologies connecting the resources 
(information, organizations, services and personnel) of the Federal, State, 
local, and tribal governments, and as appropriate, the private sector 
[SLTTP] and foreign allies, to ensure terrorism information sharing, 
access and collaboration among users is readily available.70   
                                                 
69 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, Information Sharing Environment 
Implementation Plan (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2006), 3. 
70 Ibid., 7. 
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To facilitate this obligation, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI)—yet another recommendation of the IRTPA, created to oversee, coordinate, and 
direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program (see Figure 5)—
designated a Program Manager (PM ISE) responsible for the ISE’s development.  In 
November of 2006, the PM ISE issued the Information Sharing Environment 
Implementation Plan, which prioritized the ISE’s role in “facilitating, coordinating, and 
expediting access to protected terrorism information” and creating a trusted partnership 
between all levels of government, select foreign partners, and the private sector. 71   
 
Figure 5.   Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Coordination with the 
Intelligence Community:72  
The ISE Implementation Plan recommended the development of the Interagency 
Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), co-located at the NCTC, to help 
facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related information amongst federal, state, local, tribal, 
and private sector officials.73  The ITACG was passed into law on August 3, 2007 as part 
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (the “9/11 
                                                 
71 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, 10. 
72 David J. Pile, “Overview of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Current 
Intelligence Initiatives,” presentation to the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 28, 2008. 
73 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, 28. 
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Act”), and it was officially implemented in October of 2007.  Also in October of 2007, in 
response to previous recommendations from the WMD Commission, President Bush 
released the National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in 
Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing, which provided a definition of the 
ITACG’s role in regards to interagency information-sharing processes. 74  This was the 
first time a national strategy provided direction for implementing the administration’s 
vision for sharing terrorism-related information between the various levels of 
government, disciplines, and security domains in support of the ISE (see Figure 6).75  
 
 
Figure 6.   Information-sharing Environment: Framework for Sharing Information with 
SLTTP Partners.76 
As stated in the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing, the “ITACG 
supports the efforts of the NCTC to produce ‘federally-coordinated’ terrorism-related 
information products intended for dissemination to state, local, and tribal officials and 
                                                 
74 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities, Report to the President of the United States. Note: 
The WMD Commission Report recommended that the DNI ensure that effective mechanisms are 
implemented to prevent conflicts and encourage coordination among U.S. intelligence agencies. 
75 White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing, 1. 
76 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, 71. 
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private sector partners.”77  The NCTC, based on its mission mandates, supports no such 
audience; therefore, the ITACG is intended to assist in mitigating this information-
sharing gap.  The ITACG’s creation was intended to mitigate a three-year gap in 
intelligence support from the NCTC to state and local governments.  Such support 
requires the unique subject matter expertise of state, local, and tribal officials to advise 
the federal intelligence analysts working at the NCTC, and, ultimately, the Intelligence 
Community, regarding what information is useful to those working amongst the local 
communities in law enforcement, public safety and first responder roles, and the specific 
language in which intelligence products should be written to reflect their perspective.  To 
accomplish this mission, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 
of 2007 (9/11 Act) mandated that the ITACG be comprised of two components, an 
Advisory Council and Detail, to create this required catalyst for the ISE.78 
2. ITACG Detail 
By law, the ITACG Detail—the operational component of the ITACG—is 
managed by a senior intelligence official from DHS, who serves as the organization’s 
Director and a Deputy from the FBI who is already detailed to the NCTC.79 The Detail 
was initially comprised of four full-time state and local law enforcement officials; one 
part-time tribal law enforcement official; two federal intelligence analysts (from the FBI 
and DHS); and two contract employees with former Intelligence Community and local 
law enforcement experience.80  To enhance the ITACG’s efficacy, recommendations 
were made to expand the Detail’s representation to include a state homeland security 
manager familiar with state and local homeland security operations, a representative from 
the fire service and emergency response/management community, a public health official, 
and a state/local law enforcement intelligence analyst.81  To date, only a few of these 
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recommendations have been met.  Currently, the Detail consists of 15 personnel, as it has 
added additional personnel from state and local law enforcement, fire services, and public 
health. Furthermore, representation now includes analysts from FBI, NCTC, and the 
NCTC Directorate of Intelligence.82 
Those assigned to the ITACG are appointed to the ITACG Detail through federal 
government (DHS and FBI) fellowship programs for a period of one year.  Furthermore, 
they are deputized as federal employees and do not represent their home agencies; 
instead, they represent state, local, and tribal agencies as a whole. Each representative is 
cleared at the top-secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) level (with 
counterintelligence polygraph) and is trained in the procedures for handling, processing, 
storing, and disseminating classified products. As such, they are afforded access to all 
information sources within the NCTC. 
The ITACG Detail’s role is to augment the support that the FBI and DHS give to 
non-federal partners by advising the Intelligence Community, providing direction to 
federal analysts regarding what information is necessary, and how products should be 
tailored and delivered to meet the needs of SLTTP officials as they conduct 
counterterrorism activities to protect their respective communities.83 Those assigned to 
the Detail are tasked with tracking and assessing FBI, DHS, and NCTC intelligence 
products—both pre-and post-dissemination—to identify ways in which the products can 
better serve the intelligence requirements of the ITACG’s target audience.  When 
necessary, requests are made for language adjustments, as well as the inclusion of 
additional detail that would be beneficial to first responders.  Their goal is to simplify and 
expedite messages conveyed from the Intelligence Community; make certain that all 
information necessary to enhance “local” situational awareness, preparedness, 
prevention, and response capabilities is provided.  Moreover, the Detail’s goal includes 
influencing the writing style of those at the federal-level who generate information-
products specifically for this community; and, ultimately, to ensure that whenever 
                                                 
82 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment, 2010 Report on the Interagency Threat 
Assessment and Coordination Group (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
2010), 17. 
83 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
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possible, information is provided at the lowest classification level possible and is 
approved for broad distribution.84  To promote this function, the Detail is authorized to 
request UNCLASSIFIED tear line reports and classification downgrades from the 
originators of intelligence products and request product transfers between different 
classification systems (SCI to secret) so that applicable products can reach a more 
expansive array of consumers outside the federal government (see Figure 7).85    
 
Figure 7.   ITACG Intelligence Product Augmentation Methodology86 
While the ITACG signifies—for the first time—inclusion of the SLTTP 
perspective in the intelligence activities occurring within the IC, questions remain as to 
the level of support the ITACG has received to assist it in facilitating its mission; and 
whether or not its charter competes with the mission and intentions of DHS’s Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A).  Many are skeptical regarding whether or not the 
ITACG can actually provide value to state and local officials with such a limited number  
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86Tim Connolly, “Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group” (Presentation to the 
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of representatives staffing its operation. The U.S. is currently developing fusion centers 
within all states and most major urban areas; can the ITACG be used as an intelligence-
sharing conduit to each center?  
This thesis aims to identify potential solutions to leverage existing intelligence 
operations that can promote an intelligence-sharing continuum across all tiers of 
government. The author’s research and experience indicates that numerous policy, 
technological, cultural and political challenges exist, all contributing to the less-than-
perfect nature of the United States’ existing counterterrorism framework.  Over the last 
four years, policymakers and practitioners have collaborated at a greater pace to carefully 
navigate the political landscape and operational requirements in their creation of policies 
and operational practices to ensure that security solutions do not violate the privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties of U.S. citizens or over-tax limited resources. Working together, 
they must continue to reinforce the required continuum for intelligence sharing and 
analysis amongst numerous agencies and levels of government to mitigate the inherent 
risk of terrorist attacks upon our nation. Chapters V and VI provide an analysis of 
specific, priority issues that require fixing within our nation’s counterterrorism apparatus.  
Chapters VII and VIII provide evidence-based recommendations to improve the 
capability and value of existing intelligence support structures and further-develop the 
desired intelligence-sharing continuum. 
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As previously stated, the events of September 11, 2001, were a major catalyst for 
intelligence reform in the United States.  However, despite the changes that have 
occurred throughout the U.S. intelligence composition since this date, significant issues 
still remain that are impeding the creation and flow of useful information and intelligence 
to support homeland security efforts; this has been identified from research conducted on 
numerous sources.  To fulfill the requirements of this thesis’ research question—
identifying what practices and processes should be implemented among state and major 
urban area fusion centers and the federal Intelligence Community to promote an 
intelligence-sharing continuum and make fusion centers more effective in meeting the 
needs of their consumers—an assortment of organizational structures, policies, practices, 
and initiatives were analyzed to identify strengths and weaknesses based both against 
what each is intended to be carrying out and accomplishing, and what each is doing in 
reality.  In the end, a triangulation methodology was administered to test the consistency 
of findings from several research techniques in order to corroborate the true causes 
influencing the results. According to social science experts, “Triangulation involves the 
careful reviewing of data collected through different methods in order to achieve a more 
accurate and valid estimate of qualitative results for a particular construct.”87 
During the research and analysis process, themes regarding current discrepancies 
were acknowledged from the author’s subject matter expertise and experience, 
conferences and classes attended, and interviews and discourse with professionals 
working amongst the intelligence, law enforcement, and public safety communities.  
Additionally, strengths, weaknesses, and “gaps” were identified from the analysis of 
academic journals and scholarly articles; documented research conducted by 
Congressional, federal, and state government oversight groups, and private sector 
research organizations; Senatorial and Congressional hearings and testimonies; revised 
                                                 
87 Maria Oliver-Hoyo and DeeDee Allen, “The Use of Triangulation Methods in Qualitative 
Educational Research,” Journal of College Science Teaching 35, no. 4 (2006): 42–47.  
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national strategies, policies, and executive orders; and mandated reports and statements 
by agency executives regarding specific organizations and initiatives, and their progress 
since being implemented.  Through triangulation, all of the aforementioned interactions, 
experiences, and literary products influenced the analysis of the issue at hand by 
contributing information that corroborated the true underlying problems; and 
furthermore, assisted with the formulation of recommendations to resolve several 
problems associated with intelligence sharing. 
Consequently, a relatively small amount of research is available in academic 
circles regarding these issues from the practitioners’ perspective.  While it is common to 
find documents that describe a sentiment of dissatisfaction regarding the current state of 
intelligence production and sharing among intelligence consumers involved in homeland 
security efforts (particularly, from SLTTP officials), it was difficult to determine, 
exclusively through literature reviews, interviews, and discourse, exactly what issues 
continue to be problematic—as well as what practical solutions exist—related to the 
current state of affairs.  Therefore, it was necessary to collect and analyze the knowledge 
of those directly engaged in information and intelligence production and sharing for 
counterterrorism and homeland security purposes in order to seek explicit insight into 
these issues from the practitioner’s point of view.  Ultimately, through triangulation, the 
author analyzed the common themes acknowledged by practitioners against that of the 
aforementioned secondary research to identify the underlying issues and formulate policy 
recommendations.  
B. THE DELPHI METHOD 
Additional research was necessary to better understand—from the practitioners’ 
perspective—the causes of inadequacies in information and intelligence production and 
sharing between the federal government, fusion centers, and the consumers of fusion 
center-generated intelligence products, as well as the practical solutions considered 
applicable for fixing the problems.  Accordingly, further research was carried out to 
complement and expand upon the substantial insight provided by organizations such as 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), National Governors Association (NGA), U.S. 
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Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO), the Manhattan Institute for Policy 
Research, and the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) on the topic of 
both fusion centers and intelligence sharing.   
Traditionally, policy recommendations for complex issues are drafted as an 
outcome of meetings, committees, and conferences involving professionals with great 
knowledge in the area in question. 88  Unfortunately, there is a lack of anonymity in this 
type of setting, and, as a result, the ideas and insights of individuals are often influenced 
by those of others involved in the process.89  For instance, one may be reluctant to 
disagree with the recommendations of a superior or those of an individual who is seen as 
a top expert in the field; consequently, such situations are highly susceptible to “group 
think,” and individuals refrain from sufficiently voicing their opinions, concerns, or 
ideas.  Additionally, convening a group of experts from a broad geographic area can be 
difficult to accomplish due to both logistical and financial challenges, and 
time/scheduling restraints; thus, complicated matters may not be adequately resolved 
because those best suited to be involved in the policy transformation are unable to 
participate.   
The Delphi method is a structured communication process for collecting and 
refining knowledge from a group of experts by means of a series of questionnaires and 
controlled feedback.  It is a technique that is often used when there is a complex problem, 
a lack of knowledge available to answer a research question, and when anonymity is 
necessary.90 Because the Delphi method does not require face-to-face contact, it is 
particularly useful for involving experts, users, resource controllers, or administrators 
who cannot come together physically.91  Furthermore, the Delphi method prevents 
domination by certain individuals and can also be used to aggregate judgments where 
people are hostile toward one another, or where individual personality styles would be 
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distracting in a face-to-face setting—such as in this case, when collecting expert opinions 
from individuals of various ranks in law enforcement, intelligence, and public safety 
agencies.92  Ultimately, the Delphi method is designed to increase the creative 
productivity of group action, facilitate group decisions, help stimulate the generation of 
critical ideas, give guidance in the aggregation of individual judgments, and, in all these 
endeavors, save human effort and energy and leave participants with a sense of 
satisfaction.93  This methodology can be used to serve a broad variety of interests, but 
was preferred particularly for its strengths in generating a base for evaluation and 
accommodating policy decisions to diverse points of view and desires.94  
The Delphi process typically involves three groups:  
1. A researcher or research team that works with  
2. Policy/decision makers to design questionnaires that focus upon problems, 
objectives, solutions, or forecasts to elicit the proper discourse (the 
policy/decision makers will utilize the outcomes of the Delphi method), 
and 
3. A manageable group of respondents/experts whose judgments are being 
sought.   
The first questionnaire asks the participants to respond to a broad question or set 
of questions; this questionnaire is then returned to the research team, and is analyzed and 
summarized.  Each subsequent questionnaire is built upon the responses to the preceding 
questionnaire; they contain summary information and may ask participants to disagree or 
agree with that which has been presented by the others to rank order and/or to indicate 
strengths and weaknesses.  The complete process, depending on availability of staff, is 
estimated to take between 45 and 90 days to complete; ultimately, it stops when a 
consensus has been generated among participants or when sufficient information 
exchange has been obtained—typically after two to six questionnaires have been  
 
 
                                                 




disseminated and returned.  The questionnaires can be accessed and disseminated via 
traditional mail, email, personal website, or online survey tools (which were utilized for 
this thesis). 
1. Thesis Intelligence Delphi Panel 
In February 2008, a Delphi panel was coordinated to discuss the shortcomings 
that are leading to deficiencies in counter-terrorism and homeland security intelligence 
production and flow between the Intelligence Community, fusion centers, and the 
consumers of fusion center-generated intelligence; this was to serve as a major 
component of the author’s research.  In coordinating the Delphi panel, approximately 30 
intelligence experts and practitioners were solicited from federal agencies such as DHS 
and FBI, fusion center administrators and analysts, and fusion center intelligence 
consumers, such as state and local law enforcement and public safety officials, as well as 
individuals from private sector organizations. The intention was to generate a relative 
sample of panelists representative of those agencies and organizations involved in the 
domestic homeland security information “fusion” process, from agencies and 
organizations situated throughout the U.S. Panelists were identified, solicited, and 
selected based on merit, experience, recommendation, relevance to and involvement in 
the Information Sharing Environment, and their ability and consent to participate.  
To fulfill the requirements of the research questions, a total of 22 panelists were 
enlisted to participate in the Delphi process, representing federal, state, local, and private 
sector agencies positioned throughout the U.S.  Each enlisted panelist was contacted via 
email to discuss the subject of the research and the procedures required, including the 
necessary commitment; additionally, an agreement was made that each panelist’s 
identity, as well as his/her answers, would be kept both confidential and anonymous.  
Each panelist agreed to complete two 15-minute questionnaires and to return them to the 
author within a “short time frame” (typically, within three days to two weeks of receipt), 
for a total of one-and-a-half hours over a period of one to three months.   
The primary objective of the Delphi method was to disseminate two to three 
iterations of short answer questionnaires in order to collect a consensus from the 
 44 
practitioners regarding what is contributing to deficiencies in intelligence production and 
flow amongst the numerous agencies involved in counterterrorism and homeland 
security, as well as what they believe could ultimately help promote greater practices and 
processes to fix the problems.  As an additional component of the strategy, the panelists 
were to be separated into subcategories according to their agency type—federal, fusion 
center, state and local law enforcement, non-law enforcement public safety, private 
sector—in order to categorize and analyze the insight of those working at the various 
levels and positions of government and industry in anticipation of variance in opinions.  
The use of a Delphi panel to generate this consensus was necessary as there is a lack of 
heterogeneous information available summarizing these issues from the practitioner’s 
standpoint; additionally, there is a lack of homogeneous information available 
summarizing these issues from the collective perspective of each tier of government and 
industry.  
The first iteration of questions was intended to generate a brainstorming session 
for important factors, whereas the second iteration was intended to confine the original 
list of answers to the most important ones, and to create a final list by rank-ordering the 
most important factors presented by the panelists.  While implementing the Delphi 
process, guidance was obtained from the Delphi frameworks provided in Okoli and 
Pawlowski’s article, “The Delphi Method as a Research Tool: An example, Design 
Considerations and Applications,” and Delbecq’s book, Group Techniques for Program 
Planning: A Guide to Nominal Group and Delphi Processes.95,  
2. Questionnaire 1 
In questionnaire 1, each panelist was asked to help identify and explore the 
principal strengths and weaknesses of the current intelligence production and sharing 
practices that are in place between the federal Intelligence Community, fusion centers, 
and the consumers of fusion center-generated intelligence.  This questionnaire was 
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designed to set the tone for the subsequent questionnaire and the ensuing discourse and 
analysis.  Below are the questions included in the first questionnaire: 
1. To the best of your knowledge, are most intelligence and information 
consumers satisfied with the current standard of products and services 
provided by state and local fusion centers?96  Why or Why Not? 
2. List the major factors that are affecting information and intelligence 
production at fusion centers.  
3. List significant factors, practices, and/or processes that would help fusion 
centers generate relevant information/intelligence products and services.  
4. List the major factors that currently affect information flow between: 
a. The federal Intelligence Community and fusion centers 
b. Domestic information/intelligence collectors and fusion centers97 
c. Fusion centers and the consumers of fusion center-generated 
products and services 
5. List significant factors, practices, and/or processes that would positively 
influence the flow of information between: 
d. The federal Intelligence Community and fusion centers 
e. Domestic information/intelligence collectors and fusion centers 
f. Fusion centers and the consumers of fusion center-generated 
products and services 
6. Any other factors you care to address: 
These questions were drafted to generate themes in the experiences and opinions 
of a broad sample of the nation’s intelligence practitioners. Furthermore, the objective 
was to begin identifying problems and potential solutions to improve intelligence 
production and flow and make fusion centers more effective in meeting the needs of their 
consumers.  (The answers to this questionnaire can be found in the Appendix). 
                                                 
96 For the purposes of this Delphi process: federal, state, local, tribal, private and public sector 
policymakers, managers, agencies and organizations that are supported by the analysis, products and 
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3. Questionnaire 2 
After collecting and analyzing the responses from questionnaire 1, common 
themes were identified and prepared for the second round of the Delphi process.  The 
purpose of questionnaire 2 was to develop a greater consensus regarding the most 
significant issues that are affecting intelligence production and sharing, as well as the 
most significant practices and processes necessary to improve these issues.  Additionally, 
panelists were asked to rank-order each of the items to differentiate between those that 
they felt were most important and those that they felt were least important.  Finally, the 
author sought to identify areas of agreement and disagreement, and to discuss items that 
may need further clarification.  (The structure and content of questionnaire 2 can be 
found in the Appendix). 
Ultimately, the Delphi method was an effective research tool that allowed the 
author to survey and to question a representative sample of senior intelligence, law 
enforcement, and public safety professionals working and residing in various 
jurisdictions throughout the nation.  It would not have been possible to convene such an 
exceptional group of individuals for this policy research—especially for the duration of 
time that the project took—as logistics, funding, and scheduling would have created 
significant complications, and thus the desired results would not have been achievable.  
Additionally, some of the dialogue generated from the questions contained controversial 
themes that might have proven problematic if all of the panelists were together in one 
room. This was primarily due to the differences in opinion of those working amongst the 
different tiers of government and industry, as well as a few agencies that appear to be 
competing.  Finally, the insights gained through the Delphi process were significant to 
the methodological triangulation in verifying the results of prior research and analysis 
conducted on this topic. Collecting and analyzing the insight from these experts and 
practitioners was beneficial to the author’s final policy recommendations for promoting 
an intelligence-sharing continuum for homeland security and counterterrorism support. 
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V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH FUSION CENTERS? 
While intelligence production and sharing strategies have improved since the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, they have not yet reached an adequate level of satisfaction 
amongst all homeland security stakeholders.  During the last 10 years, information 
sharing has been hampered by a number of impediments that recent legal enhancements 
and organizational changes have not been able to completely fix. The author’s research 
methodologies were able to corroborate several themes of issues that are affecting the 
required intelligence-sharing continuum. Some of the most recognized issues are related 
to the classification of information, inadequate information-sharing channels, low human 
capital, and a lack of specific, and/or actionable intelligence products provided to state, 
local, and tribal agencies from both the Intelligence Community and fusion centers.  
Those dissatisfied include senior executives from numerous U.S. government agencies, 
organizations, and officials working in various law enforcement, public safety, and 
security roles at the operational level.  Consequently, this has many fearing that our 
nation’s first preventers and first responders may not be adequately prepared if or when 
the next terrorist attack occurs. 
In July of 2007, the Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee stated:  
The nationwide network of fusion centers intended to gather 
counterterrorism intelligence is suffering from a lack of direction from the 
Homeland Security Department.  Because of a lack of effective federal 
leadership, state and local [agencies] have taken it upon themselves to 
create these centers with varying levels of success.98  
At the time that the author’s research for this thesis began (2007), no minimum 
standards existed to ensure that fusion centers operated efficiently, were built to interact 
with other fusion centers as a network, or were meeting the unique needs of each center’s  
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respective intelligence consumers.99  Many had little private sector input, encountered 
difficulties with the classification of information, and had limited access to relevant 
information databases.100  
The aforementioned statement and analysis was verified through methodological 
triangulation of secondary research, and ultimately, the results from the Delphi panel.  
The themes identified from the overall triangulation indicate that there are some 
significant, specific, overarching issues.  However, in the end, there were some topics 
that could not be corroborated through triangulation, as there was great diversity in the 
individual answers provided amongst the various panelists and sub-groups that 
participated in the Delphi panel, leading to a lack of consensus.  For example, apparent 
from the concluding analysis of the Delphi process was the following: While a panelist 
operating from a specific locality identified one issue as particularly important, a panelist 
working in the same position, but from a different locality, identified the same issue as 
significantly less important.  This, triangulated with the results of the other analytic 
methodologies administered, has led the author to believe that a lack of overall guidance 
and oversight may indeed be leading to many of the intelligence production and sharing 
issues present amongst the nation’s homeland security apparatus.  Ultimately, the leaders 
of fusion centers have been left to design, staff, and operate each center on their own with 
limited guidance, leading to a variance in the effectiveness of different areas of the 
overall function.  For example: 
• While some centers indicate that they have strong technological 
connectivity with partner agencies, other centers do not.   
• While some centers indicate that they have established substantial 
strategic objectives across a diverse group of stakeholders, other centers 
have not.   
• Where some federal agency representatives are successfully integrated 
into fusion center operations, other federal agency representatives are not.   
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• Where some centers have integrated non-law enforcement public safety 
officials into the routine operations, other centers lack the presence of non-
law enforcement officials. 
• Where some centers have adequate connectivity to classified Intelligence 
Community products through classified computer terminals inside a 
“secure room” approved for handling secret-level classified information 
constructed within the confines of their fusion center, other centers lack 
the same connectivity due to the absence of a secure room. 
C. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION, SHARING, AND SATISFACTION 
Fusion centers appear to be missing the mark when it comes to satisfying their 
consumers.  As indicated in the results of questionnaire 1 from the Delphi process, 68 
percent of the respondents reported that from their perspective most intelligence and 
information consumers are dissatisfied with the current standard of products and services 
provided by state and local fusion centers.101  Furthermore, the following issues were 
identified as recurring themes in the responses of the panelists pertaining to the problems 
associated with consumer satisfaction; thus, those issues related to intelligence 
production, and intelligence and information sharing: 
• Fusion center executives lack leadership skills, strategic focus, and 
experience with intelligence. 
• Fusion centers are not receiving timely, actionable information from 
federal agencies, which is problematic for subsequent intelligence 
distribution to key homeland security stakeholders who seek to create 
effective prevention and response strategies. 
• Fusion centers have failed to identify logical, strategically focused 
intelligence requirements toward which federal agency products and 
services can be focused. 
• Fusion centers are failing to comprehensively respond to the intelligence 
needs of consumers.  
• Consumers have failed to adequately identify clear, concise, realistic 
intelligence requirements towards which fusion center products and 
services can be tailored. 
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• Fusion centers have struggled to reach an adequate collaborative capacity; 
they are failing to include representatives from a variety of public safety 
and private sector agencies in fusion center strategic planning, operations, 
and other activities. 
• Fusion centers are disseminating products that lack analysis, value, and 
relevance; their products are not always timely or actionable. 
• Fusion centers are still working to develop the necessary analytical and 
operational skills within each center. 
• Consumers do not understand the unique capabilities and limitations of 
their respective fusion center.  
• Consumers have not yet been adequately educated in intelligence, analytic 
lexicons, and the purpose and meaning of many of the products provided. 
• Fusion centers have yet to develop adequate feedback and follow-
mechanisms to identify the utility of information and intelligence provided 
to and from consumers.  
• The Intelligence Community, fusion centers, and consumers have yet to 
develop adequate technological solutions to facilitate collaboration, data 
connectivity, information sharing, knowledge management, and product 
delivery.102 
Despite the emphasis on all-source, multi-disciplinary participation, collaboration 
is a significant issue for many of our nation’s fusion centers.  Currently, the majority of 
fusion centers consist primarily of law enforcement entities, as they are predominantly 
owned and operated by the state police or statewide investigative bureaus. Additionally, 
the majority of the local police representation is drawn from the larger departments that 
are able to provide resources to the center, not necessarily the smaller municipal 
agencies.103  While many of our nation’s fusion centers have some non-law enforcement 
representation (which in many cases is part-time), there appears to be an absence of full 
time inclusion in their daily operations, which makes meeting the needs of non-law 
enforcement public safety partners difficult.104  Similarly, the majority of fusion centers 
have yet to include representatives from the various critical infrastructure sectors and 
have failed to implement practices and processes capable of supporting a broad range of 
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private sector partners.105  Due to this disconnect, it is unclear at this time whether or not 
those working at fusion centers have in fact adequately identified the most significant 
risks, threats, and vulnerabilities within their jurisdictions, or are sufficiently fulfilling 
their missions to mitigate them.  Consequently, effective collaboration across diverse 
agencies and sectors appears to be a rare phenomenon. This is adversely affecting the 
necessary relationships between fusion centers and their partners and intelligence 
producers and intelligence consumers, and, thus, fusion centers are unable to meet the 
needs of their stakeholders.  
D. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
In July of 2007 the Congressional Research Service published a report titled 
Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, which summarized research conducted 
on the 43 fusion centers established nationwide at that time.106  One of the major issues 
identified from their research was related to the collective, inadequate use of the 
intelligence cycle at fusion centers.  It is, therefore, no coincidence that several of the 
problematic themes identified from the Delphi panel can be attributed to the absence of a 
well-administered intelligence cycle, verifying the results of previous analyses.  Proper 
use of the intelligence cycle will ensure that strategic objectives are determined and 
realized; intelligence gaps are identified; information is gathered, synthesized, analyzed, 
and disseminated according to the unique needs of decision-makers; proactive and 
defensive measures are established, and resources are more efficiently allocated due to 
the provision of valuable insights.  While not all fusion centers are experiencing a 
complete failure in their administration of the intelligence cycle, many are falling short 
on at least a few of its key components.107  
1. Planning, Requirements, and Collection 
According to the results of the Delphi process, several fusion centers have failed 
to identify logical, strategically focused intelligence priorities toward which federal 
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agency products and services can be focused, and they have failed to comprehensively 
respond to the information and intelligence needs of consumers. This is indicative of a 
deficiency in their prioritization of the planning, requirements, and collection steps of the 
intelligence cycle.  If fusion center administrators are not routinely meeting and/or 
communicating with partners and consumers to discuss intelligence requirements and 
strategic priorities, problems will result from the ensuing lack of focus.  Consequently, 
intelligence producers will risk creating intelligence analytic products based upon what 
they assume the consumer wants to know, rather than upon what the consumer needs to 
know.  Intelligence requirements are necessary to dictate which issues should receive top 
priority based upon recognized threats, present trends, the geo-political environment, and 
perceived risks and vulnerabilities; they are often unique to the needs of each respective 
intelligence consumer.108  Furthermore, setting appropriate intelligence requirements and 
strategically focusing operations and objectives will help ensure that the fusion center is 
utilizing resources more effectively and efficiently, while making certain that personnel 
are concentrating efforts—including information collection, analysis, and intelligence 
production—on that which takes precedence.  
The results from the Delphi panel also revealed that several fusion centers have 
not reached an adequate collaborative capacity, which is ultimately affecting their ability 
to sufficiently plan, prioritize, and address consumer needs.  The indication that 
consumers have failed to adequately identify relevant intelligence requirements toward 
which fusion center products and services can be tailored; that consumers do not 
understand the unique capabilities and limitations of their respective fusion center; and 
that consumers have not yet been adequately educated in intelligence, as well as the 
purpose and meaning of intelligence products, is again, a reflection of minimal levels of 
coordination between fusion center administrators and their partners.   
Fusion center personnel must establish trusted, collaborative relationships with 
their partners and intelligence consumers, educate them of the capabilities and limitations 
of the center, and determine appropriate intelligence requirements to address and serve.  
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After all, the absence of collaboration with partner agencies and organizations ultimately 
contradicts the principle organizational intention behind the development of fusion 
centers and will have a negative effect on all subsequent, necessary steps of the 
intelligence cycle for statewide or regional intelligence support purposes.  Furthermore, 
without adequate collection priorities for each respective agency and organization within 
the state or region, mission-focused data and information, which could have an effect on 
the security of the area, may not be collected or properly shared.  That which is 
independently gathered and/or observed by outside agencies will stovepipe without well-
coordinated relationships between the center and its partners.   
2. Synthesis and Analysis, Dissemination, and Feedback 
The results of the Delphi process indicated that several fusion centers are 
disseminating products that lack analysis, value, and relevance.  This issue signifies 
discrepancies in the synthesis and analysis, dissemination, and feedback steps of the 
intelligence cycle.   
Ultimately, fusion centers are at a loss without a sufficient analytic capacity—this 
is perhaps the most important skill required of centers, and the purpose of their existence.  
Talented and experienced analysts must be present at each center, employing and 
exhausting a myriad of analytic methodologies, tools, and resources to extract meaning, 
develop hypotheses, and draw accurate, objective inferences from data and information 
that has been targeted for specific purposes.  Analysts must be proficient at estimating 
information for underlying implications—which are often not readily apparent—and be 
competent in identifying patterns and trends within disparate data sources to determine 
the “big picture.”  Another critical skill of the analyst is the ability to express his/her self 
both orally and in writing.109   
As many critics and practitioners alike have stated since 9/11, and what has 
become somewhat of a cliché in terms of today’s analytic function, a necessity of the  
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intelligence analyst is the fundamental skill to “connect the dots.”  However, in regards to 
this statement, as well as the complexities of the intelligence analyst’s role, Lowenthal 
has remarked: 
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the phrase “connect 
the dots” became prevalent.  Connecting the dots depends on all the dots 
being present to draw the right picture.…The Intelligence Community was 
accused of not connecting the dots in the run-up to September 11, but was 
accused of connecting too many dots regarding the alleged Iraqi weapons 
of mass destruction.110  
A more useful description is that intelligence analysis is similar to 
assembling a mosaic, but one in which the desired final picture may not be 
clear.  Not all of the mosaic pieces are available.  Further complicating 
matter, in the course of assembling the mosaic, new pieces appear and 
some old ones change size, shape, and color.111 
Additionally, the Delphi panel indicated that adequate technological solutions to 
facilitate collaboration, data connectivity, information sharing, knowledge management, 
and product delivery have yet to be developed.  This particular issue directly affects the 
type, quality, and consistency of data and information flowing to the fusion center, as 
well as the center’s ability to effectively synthesize, analyze, coordinate on, and 
disseminate finalized intelligence to consumers through timely and appropriate means.  
Ultimately, the results of analyses must be tailored into products that satisfy the 
consumer’s needs in order for the products to be acknowledged, utilized, and become 
actionable.112  Once again, this emphasizes the need to adhere to consumer intelligence 
(production) requirements.  However, without the necessary technological solutions to 
help facilitate the fusion center’s communication, collaboration, and information 
collection and processing requirements (i.e., technological requirements), analysts and 
other personnel within the center will fall short on efforts to satisfy intelligence consumer 
expectations and needs. 
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Finally, the reception of feedback regarding fusion center products and services 
was determined to be an additional problem.  As specified by the panel, several fusion 
centers have yet to develop adequate feedback and follow-up mechanisms to identify the 
utility of information provided to and from consumers.  If or when consumers are 
dissatisfied with the quality of analyses, the format in which products are presented, or 
the means through which products are delivered, fusion center administrators and 
analysts must work with the consumers to alter existing production strategies to mirror 
the content, format, style, and delivery mechanisms desired by each consumer in order to 
meet their production requirements.  Ultimately, this necessitates collaborative 
relationships between fusion center personnel and their intelligence consumers, as well as 
the use of various feedback instruments and procedures deemed effective by those 
working both within and outside the center. 
An important fact to consider, which was clearly identified by the Delphi panel 
and corroborated through secondary research, is that fusion center administrators are still 
working to develop the necessary analytic and operational skills within the centers.  As 
previously mentioned, fusion centers are a relatively new development within the 
nation’s intelligence apparatus; thus, adequate development will come as time passes and 
personnel are able to enhance analytic and investigative skill sets.  Due to the policies 
surrounding the allocation of federal funding for personnel, fusion center administrators 
have experienced difficulty hiring and sustaining analytic and investigative positions 
within the centers.  In many cases, personnel are assigned to fusion centers “on loan” by 
partner agencies; furthermore, analysts from contract firms are often supplanted using 
temporary grant funding to enhance the limited, but existing analytic capacity.  Greater 
support is necessary from state and municipal administrations to prioritize and allocate 
funding to hire qualified personnel, and, ultimately, sustain human capital. 
 
 56 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 57 
VI. FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CHALLENGES 
A 2006 National Governors Association (NGA) Center for Best Practices Issue 
Brief indicated that homeland security directors across the nation were displeased with 
the quality of intelligence provided to state and local officials from the federal 
government; this survey also marked an increase in dissatisfaction when compared to a 
similar survey conducted in 2005.113  Both reports indicated that the information received 
by state and local officials “lacked specificity and actionable quality.”114  However, the 
2007 NGA Survey reflected an improvement in the federal-state intelligence-sharing 
relationship.  According to the report: 56 percent of the state respondents were satisfied 
with the timeliness of the intelligence received, 47 percent with the specificity, and 50 
percent with the actionability. Even so, more than half of the states were dissatisfied with 
the intelligence-sharing networks established by DHS and other federal agencies, as well 
as the network-related outreach, training, and participation.115   
Regardless of the “increase” in intelligence-sharing satisfaction (which is still 
arguably undesirable as it ranges in the area of 50 percent), the sentiment of 
dissatisfaction continues to exist.  In a September 2007 testimony to the House Homeland 
Security Committee, a fusion center administrator stated, “One of the chief complaints of 
state and local officials is the lack of actionable information from the National 
Intelligence Community [to fusion centers].”116  Additionally, in a presentation at the 
March 2008 National Fusion Center Conference, the Chair of the House Homeland 
Security Subcommittee on Intelligence reprimanded DHS, stating that it is “at risk for 
losing support for funding because it is not doing a good enough job of sharing 
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information with state, local and federal homeland security officials.”117  Furthermore, 
“DHS’ Intelligence and Analysis Office (I&A) needs to improve its relationships with 
and understanding of the needs of state and local authorities.”118  
The author’s research methodologies were able to corroborate numerous factors 
affecting the continuum of information flowing between the IC and fusion centers.  
Problems were recognized regarding the lack of quality terrorism-information provided to 
state and local officials:  
• Information “Over-Classification,” Difficulty Accessing The Classified 
Information, And The Inability To Share Classified Information Broadly 
Amongst The First Responder Community;  
• The absence of a standardized framework for categorizing the various tiers 
of “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) information; and 
• Confusion due to the excessive number, and lack of organization, of 
electronic information-sharing networks (portals).   
For the purposes of this thesis, the author will focus on the verified issues that are 
specific to the effectiveness of DHS, FBI, NCTC, and the ITACG in providing 
intelligence to state and local officials. 
A. FEDERAL AGENCY SUPPORT TO STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 
State and local officials have been dissatisfied with the speed and quality of 
information that is delivered from federal agencies. Officials have expressed confusion 
regarding what types of information they should expect from the IC, or how long it will 
take for information of importance to be delivered. This leaves many desiring a “clearer 
definition” as to what types of information will be shared, when information will be 
disseminated, and to whom it will be directed.119  This was a significant theme 
triangulated through the author’s research, and it was further corroborated by the 
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responses fielded during the Delphi process.  However, the recent expansion of DHS’s 
Intelligence Officer program is beginning to provide value in this regard.  
In response to the 9/11 Act, and to assist in carrying out the President’s National 
Strategy for Information Sharing, DHS I&A has deployed a total of 73 intelligence 
officers to state and local fusion centers nationwide to provide support by facilitating the 
sharing of threat and hazard information between the IC and fusion centers.120 The 
implementation of this program is meant to address the intelligence priorities identified 
by fusion centers (from those that have, in fact, identified their priorities) and to increase 
the timeliness and quantity of information disseminated “vertically”—both from the IC to 
fusion center personnel and to the IC from the fusion centers.121  Those detailed to fusion 
centers appear to be adding value particularly through their intelligence-related subject 
matter expertise, and their ability to convey information and provide reach-back to other 
federal agencies: The DHS officers are facilitating requests for information (RFIs) that 
must be drawn from resources within the IC; accessing timely federally-produced 
intelligence and information reports (IIRs); creating homeland information reports (HIRs) 
from locally derived information that meets federal intelligence requirements, and then 
sharing this information vertically; and assisting with training, prioritization, and 
analysis.122 
Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS was granted statutory 
responsibility for coordination with state and local government personnel, agencies, and 
authorities for terrorism and homeland security-related purposes.123  Such authority 
includes the integration of relevant information, intelligence analyses, and vulnerability 
assessments with state and local governments; as well as the oversight for policies and 
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procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement, intelligence; and other information 
relating to homeland security within the federal government and between state and local 
governments.124  However, not all terrorism and homeland security-related intelligence 
created at the federal level of government is coordinated with state and local officials 
through DHS.  For example, in 2008, the FBI had 195 personnel detailed to 48 fusion 
centers to act as liaisons, investigators and analyst, and to provide subject matter 
expertise and help facilitate the communication of threat information.125  According to 
the Delphi panel and other sources, this duplication of effort often results in confusion; 
furthermore additional research indicated that this can at times lead to one federal agency 
intruding into another federal agency’s perceived “territory,” which has the potential to 
be disruptive.126  This duplication and resulting confusion presents the need for a policy 
to influence coordination amongst the various federal agencies with domestic homeland 
security and counterterrorism missions—especially those entities from DHS and DOJ that 
have established direct interactions with state and local officials—to limit duplicative 
reports, conflicting messages, and interference in investigations.127  Furthermore, many 
are requesting that the federal government provide further guidance regarding which 
federal agency is, in fact, leading domestic homeland security and counterterrorism 
efforts, as there appear to be conflictions due to the nature of the division of 
responsibilities.  While DHS was granted statutory authority for coordinating terrorism-
related information sharing, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 makes clear, “primary 
responsibility for investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism shall be vested not in 
[DHS], but rather in Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction  
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over the acts in question.” Thus, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ensures terrorism 
investigations and prosecutions remain the responsibility of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs).128   
The limited number of secure, classified terminals and secure rooms within the 
national network of fusion centers has been identified as another significant obstacle—
corroborated through the author’s research. A large amount of the threat information 
produced by federal agencies is classified and cannot be transmitted to state, local, and 
tribal agencies through traditional dissemination channels, as there are strict laws and 
protocols regarding how such information can be handled, stored, and disseminated.  
While a number of personnel assigned to fusion centers have been granted security 
clearances—particularly at the secret level—they often encounter difficulties retrieving 
and handling classified information.  Furthermore, because some fusion centers are not 
certified to house classified documents or data terminals, adequately “cleared” personnel 
are unable to access, view, or handle classified material within the confines of the 
facility.  Therefore, those centers without a secure, classified computer terminal within a 
secure room are limited in their ability to routinely access and query classified databases 
for relevant threat reporting, and monitor and analyze national security information that 
could have an impact on their state or region.  
Initially, the federal government was slow to deploy secure terminals to fusion 
centers, and most state and local officials had to rely on the FBI field offices to gain 
access to classified information.  In 2008, DHS began deploying their classified network, 
the “Homeland Secure Data Network” (HSDN), to fusion centers in greater frequency, 
prioritizing access to their network to those fusion centers with deployed DHS 
intelligence officers.  To date, HSDN has been deployed to 52 fusion centers, granting 
cleared fusion center personnel access to federal information classified at the secret 
level.129 
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B. NCTC: STATE AND LOCAL SUPPORT? 
A study of the NCTC conducted in September 2006 indicated that, “methods for 
ensuring that homeland security and terrorism information is shared among non-Federal 
Government entities and the Federal Government remains inadequate.”130  This 
highlights the perpetual challenge of horizontal and vertical information sharing—still in 
existence after September 11—amongst the various tiers of U.S. government.  Ultimately 
it has verified existing limitations in regards to the preparedness of our nation’s first 
responders, as information that first responders need at that local level, still may not be 
reaching them.  As stated in the aforementioned report, “Information sharing in support 
of the nation’s counterterrorism objectives ‘isn’t about flipping a switch;’ it involves a 
diverse landscape of players and technologies, and a myriad of cultural, security, and 
policy barriers.”131  The complexity of traditional information-sharing practices to and 
from the NCTC is illustrated in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.   Information Sharing Complexity132 
Due to the sensitive nature of terrorism-related information, as well as the 
complexity of the organizations and systems involved, there are, legitimate concerns that 
must be recognized regarding what sensitive information individuals should be granted 
access to and how the information should be communicated. According to federal 
officials, it is imperative that delicate information pertaining to sources and methods is 
not compromised and that active intelligence and law enforcement operations are not 
disrupted.133  This is believed to be much of the reason behind the why information is 
often classified at such high levels and compartmentalized within agencies for specific, 
limited audiences.  So how does information of significance to state and local first 
responders get recognized and transferred to such an audience from the complicated 
systems collecting information at the center? 
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Not all of the information and intelligence collected and analyzed within the 
NCTC is relevant to local agencies for domestic preparedness and response efforts; 
however, information of potential use by those at the state and local level of government 
is not easily accessible, as the NCTC’s statutory authorities are limited to sharing with 
federal organizations.134  As a result, those non-federal public safety officials, best suited 
to be the eyes and ears for domestic counterterrorism support, can be left uninformed and 
lacking much-needed guidance regarding current threats and terrorist tactics and 
techniques, as experienced throughout the world.  A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) indicated that the U.S. is currently challenged by threats from international terrorist 
organizations, such as al Qaeda, as well as by the proliferation of homegrown 
radicalization into Western countries (due to the aggressive propagation of anti-U.S. 
rhetoric), and the increasing number of violent, clandestine Islamic extremist cells.  
Therefore, the local law enforcement and first responder communities could benefit from 
the analysis of trends and patterns from both successful and attempted terrorist attacks, 
and other terrorist-related activities occurring throughout the world.135  To quote the NIE, 
the aforementioned threat environment “require[s] [a] greater understanding of how 
suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how best to 
identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.”136  This 
statement corroborates the aforementioned premise that local agencies must be more 
intimately involved in the collection and analysis of information related to terrorist 
activity occurring both inside and outside the U.S. 
According to the author’s research, among the most prominent issues that have 
affected the flow of useful terrorism-related information from the IC to the local law 
enforcement and first responder communities was the absence of state, local, and tribal 
agency representation at the NCTC.  This lack of “local perspective” created a void in the 
necessary expertise regarding what intelligence is relevant and essential outside the 
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federal government from the masses of intelligence gathered and analyzed within the 
center.  Accordingly, a “federal-centric” process was created that adequately pushes 
information of importance up to senior policymakers and amongst the IC, but it fails to 
provide the same level of support to those working in the front lines of our nation’s local 
communities.137  Federal agencies, such as the FBI and DHS, are expected to liaison with 
the NCTC to provide information that they believe would be important for state and local 
agencies; however, as federal entities themselves, they, too, can lack the experience and 
expertise necessary—the “local perspective”—to determine what information a specific 
locality needs to protect itself from, prepare for, and respond to, terrorist activity.   
Additionally, the analytic products created at the NCTC—as well as at other 
federal agencies—are primarily crafted in a manner that is useful to support policy 
development and decision making amongst the Executive Branch and the various IC 
components. Consequently, this writing style is often considered vague or “un-
actionable” by state and local officials, as they tend to desire information that is of more 
operational value.  This theme was verified by triangulating various sources of research, 
including the Delphi panel.  Unfortunately, while state and local officials have been 
identified as essential partners in our nation’s counterterrorism efforts, for too many years 
the IC did not consider them primary customers for their intelligence products.138  The 
NCTC’s Director recognizes that the Center must do a better job tailoring intelligence 
products to support “‘non-traditional partners’ such as FBI Joint Terrorism Task forces; 
[and] state, local, and tribal homeland security officials.”139   
Executive Order 13354 mandated the NCTC’s responsibility for supporting DHS, 
DOJ, and other federal agencies as they fulfill their responsibility to disseminate 
terrorism-related information to state, local, and tribal officials.140  While the Center now 
incorporates representatives from numerous federal organizations, during its first three 
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years of implementation it included of no state, local, or tribal representation. 
Consequently, the bulk of the NCTC’s terrorism analysis was provided exclusively to the 
IC and high-ranking government officials; since its inception, little created within the 
Center has been provided to non-federal agencies, which are outside the Center’s original 
mission space.141 
C. ITACG: THE MISSING LINK?  
1. Past and Present Challenges  
The ITACG was passed into law in 2007 to help facilitate the sharing of 
terrorism-related information amongst federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector 
officials. The NCTC, based on its mission mandates, directly supports no such audience; 
therefore, the ITACG is intended to assist in mitigating this information-sharing gap.  
The initial creation and development of the ITACG was a difficult process, inhibited by 
bureaucratic roadblocks and disagreements amongst agencies.  However, as a new 
organization within an already complex and evolving environment, it was inevitable that 
difficulty would be experienced.  The author’s various research methodologies 
corroborate a notion that the ITACG was created to resolve the dissatisfaction of 
Congress and senior leadership from state and local government regarding in the DHS’s 
ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities mandated in the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, more specifically, regarding the level and quality of support provided by the 
Department to state and local first responders. The memorandum of agreement (MOA) 
for the initial standup of the ITACG was approved on August 29, 2007, and was 
subsequently signed without delay by all necessary agency representatives, except DHS. 
According to media sources, the Department was the only organization involved that 
believed state and local officials should not participate in the organization.142  DHS 
officials questioned the MOA’s lack of information regarding the ITACG Advisory 
Council, and they requested that the MOA be clarified “to ensure that the creation of the 
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ITACG in no way restricts the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) from either 
producing or disseminating its own intelligence products.”143  This ultimately led senior 
lawmakers from Congress to believe that DHS viewed the ITACG as a threat to I&A, 
rather than an opportunity for greater information sharing.144 Senior DHS officials 
indicated that the Department would represent the interests of state and local officials, 
and that it was not necessary to include them directly.145  Reports also suggested that 
DHS officials were opposed to allowing state, local, and tribal officials serve within the 
ITACG because they believed it would create “unnecessary confusion.”146  Proponents of 
state and local inclusion suggested that DHS was reluctant to give up the power 
associated with controlling the flow of information to non-federal entities.147  
Consequently, it took over two months for the Department to finally agree and sign the 
ITACG’s MOA, which ultimately caused delays in the organization’s implementation. 
The ITACG was eventually implemented in October of 2007, and it gained its 
initial operating capability in late January 2008 when it was fully accepted under the 
management of the NCTC.  Hearings in late February 2008 indicated that Congress 
remained dissatisfied with the Department’s progress in managing the ITACG, as 
lawmakers voiced concerns and skepticism related to the extent in which DHS would 
fully embrace the ITACG’s intended purpose to break down information-sharing 
walls.148 However, the author’s professional experience indicates that those involved in 
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its development—including DHS—have since worked to overcome bureaucratic 
obstacles and many of the cultural issues that have impeded information sharing for 
decades, while advocating on behalf of our nation’s “first preventers/responders,” who 
operate outside the IC’s traditional federal realm.  
The ITACG’s collocation at the NCTC is designed to afford state, local, and tribal 
representatives unprecedented access to counterterrorism subject matter experts, direct 
interaction with those producing intelligence for both federal and non-federal 
consumption, and access to numerous classified and unclassified information systems and 
sources contained within the confines of the Center.  However, this access is only granted 
to those assigned to the Detail; and due to the high-classification of the information, the 
vast majority of the information reviewed remains just as compartmentalized after the 
ITACG’s review, as it did previously.  While, the daily NCTC-Intelligence Community 
briefings and teleconferences afford the ITACG access to highly classified terrorism-
related information, this information is rarely shared outside the Center due to its 
classification.  Some may argue that such access is unprecedented and represents a 
remarkable cultural shift, as well as a significant change in information-sharing policies 
and practices and trusted relationships amongst disparate levels of government. However, 
how much value does this model of information sharing provide to state and local first 
responders when the sharing typically ends with those detailed to the ITACG?  After all, 
the NCTC does not have the ITACG Detail representatives acting in their official 
capacities; rather, they are deputized federal employees and have no authority to report 
information back to their home agency.  State and local agencies with personnel assigned 
to the ITACG find comfort knowing that their personnel are contributing to the national 
intelligence cycle for counterterrorism but find it difficult knowing that their personnel 
cannot share the vast majority of the information they are privy to outside the NCTC.149 
The ITACG is not meant to be a point-of-contact for state and local agencies, or a conduit 
to received information from the NCTC.  Due to the limited number of personnel  
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operating at the Center, opening the door to such communication exchange would 
quickly overwhelm the Detail and would take it away from its daily review and 
coordination responsibilities.150 
Ultimately, challenges have been identified from conflicting visions related to the 
size and role of the ITACG—particularly, regarding whether or not the organization 
should be a stand-alone intelligence analysis and production entity.151  Some advise that 
this should not be the end result of this organization, as it would lose the information 
connectivity it has acquired from its current arrangement disrupt its collaboration with 
other agencies collocated within the NCTC.  Furthermore, a modification such as this has 
the potential to create an additional information stovepipe, which would undermine the 
efforts and successes that have already been experienced from the organization’s current 
orientation.  As our government continues to develop the Information Sharing 
Environment, bridging together disparate agencies that seek to protect our nation from 
terrorism, it is increasingly necessary to integrate expertise from all disciplines and levels 
of government to enhance intelligence production and analysis efforts.  Creating a “stand 
alone” entity to fulfill the mission set forth in the ITACG charter would prove 
counterproductive.   
Administrative issues related to sustaining ITACG operations remain a significant 
challenge, as officials have experienced complications recruiting personnel to fulfill the 
requirements of the Detail, and Congressionally appropriated funding for its operation 
has not been secured beyond FY2012.152  Due to the nature of the staffing requirements 
and the deteriorating condition of the nation’s economy, state and local public safety 
agencies are hesitant to give up their best and brightest to a year-long detail outside their 
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jurisdictions when little measurable benefit is reciprocated directly to the host agency.153 
Many of our nation’s public safety agencies are currently operating at or below minimum 
staffing levels, and thus it is difficult justifying the loss of additional positions from daily 
operations. There has been significant focus on the amount of time individuals are 
assigned to the ITACG, incentives for the assignments, and how ones relocation to the 
Washington, D.C. area can be made easier.  Furthermore, it is unknown whether or not 
Congress has seen enough benefit from the ITACG’s operation to warrant sustaining its 
operation. 
According to one local official: 
Some feel that it is unclear what role state, tribal and local law 
enforcement will actually play within the ITACG, as the [ISE 
Implementation] Plan appears to limit participation to representatives from 
DHS, FBI, DOD, and other ‘relevant Federal (emphasis added) 
organizations.’  Further, the Plan emphasizes that, although it is going to 
be co-located with the NCTC, the ITACG ‘will not be a part of the 
NCTC,’ and it ‘is not intended to duplicate, impede, or otherwise interfere 
with the existing and established counterterrorism roles and 
responsibilities.’ Consequently, on several levels, the ITACG does not 
appear to address fully the concern that the NCTC is lacking in non-
federal representation. Indeed, the Plan’s language refers to producing 
‘federally coordinated’ information instead of ‘jointly coordinated,’ or 
more ideally, ‘collaboratively produced intelligence.’154 
According to a local official currently assigned to the Detail: 
The ITACG efforts are intended to complement and supplement existing 
analytic, production, and dissemination efforts by Federal entities.  The 
ITACG does not create, transfer, or deliver intelligence products; rather, it 
helps to facilitate these processes through established DHS and FBI 
mechanisms [see Figure 9].155   
Internal to the NCTC, the provision of appropriate security clearances for those 
detailed to the ITACG and coordinating disparate fellowship programs to fund the 
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organization has proven difficult.  Challenges also remain in “bottom-up” information 
sharing from state and local officials and the fact that the establishment of feedback 
mechanisms—outside the existing informal communication chains—has yet to be 
determined.156   
 
2. ITACG Successes 
 
Figure 9.   ITACG Facilitated Dissemination Procedure157 
It is, however, important to note the many successes of the ITACG since its 
implementation. The ITACG signifies a new and enhanced relationship between the IC 
and non-federal public safety officials. Most significantly, it involves for the first time, 
inclusion of the “state, local, and tribal perspective” in the intelligence activities 
occurring at the national level.  During the first months of the ITACG’s development, 
those assigned to the organization focused a significant amount of time reviewing 
previously published intelligence products for information of value, requesting 
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classification downgrades, and assisting with product tailoring efforts.158  Between 
October 23, 2007 and April 7, 2008, over 40,000 previously published intelligence 
products were reviewed, resulting in the identification of 25 “valuable” products that had 
not been disseminated—16 of which were subsequently downgraded and re-
disseminated.159  Additionally, over 2,588 threat reports were reviewed—97 of which 
were related to the U.S. and identified for state, local, and tribal use.160  Ultimately, 
existing reports that were not downgraded or released for state and local consumption 
during the course of the ITACG’s comprehensive review were verified by those detailed 
to the ITACG as outside the needs of state and local officials and, thus, irrelevant to their 
operational requirements.   
More recently, however, the ITACG’s subject matter expertise has been leveraged 
in order to shape products by providing substantive input as they are published or prior to 
their dissemination.161 Currently, all the intelligence products that leave the NCTC and 
are intended for state and local consumption are reviewed by the ITACG prior to their 
release.  Such measures have involved efforts to put intelligence sources, as well as the 
threats portrayed, into proper context to assist state and local officials in their efforts to 
increase awareness and establish defensive postures, while avoiding “over-reaction” and 
unnecessary resource deployment and expenditures.  For the same reason, equally 
sufficient measures have been taken to provide greater detail in finished intelligence 
products distributed to state and local partners.  For example, according to an ITACG 
representative: 
The ITACG assisted NCTC analysts in the tailoring of an intelligence 
product regarding Ricin toxicity and use, precipitated by the discovery of 
the rare, yet toxic substance in a Las Vegas motel room in late February 
2008.  Accordingly, those detailed to the ITACG recommended specific 
modifications to make the product more useful to state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement and first responders, as the product in its original state 
lacked critical information necessary for safe response and mitigation 
                                                 





protocols.  The detailees requested an enhanced description regarding 
what constituted a lethal dose of Ricin, as well as additional descriptors—
such as what it looks and smells like in various forms—so that law 
enforcement and other first responders could be more prepared if or when 
they encountered the substance.  The original product recommended 
‘wearing personal protective equipment (PPE)’ when Ricin is suspected; 
the ITACG requested the minimum safe level of protective equipment be 
identified in the final product, so that law enforcement officials could 
decide if they are properly equipped to respond, or if they should request 
the assistance of specially trained HAZMAT personnel.162 
One of the most broadly recognized outputs of the ITACG is the Roll Call 
Release (see Figure 10).  The Roll Call Release is a joint DHS-FBI publication, produced 
at the Unclassified For Official Use Only release-classification, which includes 
significant input from the ITACG Detail for state and local relevance.  The contents of 
the product are kept very brief and include photos, illustrations, and short information 
summaries focused on indicators, tactics, techniques, procedures, and trends related to 
terrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction.163  Additionally, most 
products provide directions for the reader to find additional information relative to the 
topics discussed, so that more research can be conducted if desired.  Research verified 
that this is a first-of-its-kind production designed exclusively for release to non-federal, 
“street level” first responders.  The reaction to this product from state and local officials 
has been mixed: research indicates that to some, the information provided is 
“elementary” and bears little value, while others that traditionally have less exposure to 
the information provided through this publication find it highly valuable.164  Overall, the 
Roll Call Release productions can be evaluated as successful considering that their 
contents are often derived from intelligence gleaned from both past and recent terrorism 
investigations, and thus fills an intelligence gap for many with public safety 
responsibilities. 
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Figure 10.   Example of Roll Call Release165 
Additionally, the ITACG’s expertise has been harnessed to publish the 
Intelligence Guide for First Responders, a joint production by state, local, and federal 
partners engaged through the activities of the ITACG (see Figure 11).  The guide was 
designed to assist state, local, and tribal first responders in accessing and understanding 
federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction 
reporting.166  It provides first responders that work outside the federal government with 
an overview of intelligence and the IC; what reporting is available to state, local, tribal, 
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and private sector officials and how to access it; understanding threat information; and IC 
terminology and acronyms.  Mass quantities of the guide were provided to fusion centers 
for release to their homeland security partners and to over 48,000 state, local, and tribal 
police and fire departments across the nation. Additionally, PDF versions of the guide 
have been posted to several secure portals and are available for computer download and 
re-posting purposes.167  
 
Figure 11.   ITACG Intelligence Guide for First Responders168 
Efforts are being made to educate state, local, and tribal officials of the role of the 
ITACG and to assist them in accessing the information it coordinates. The ITACG 
interacts with state and local partners during a weekly threat teleconference and bi-
weekly video teleconference hosted by DHS.169  In addition, the Detail also delivers its 
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information-sharing message during national conferences, ad hoc meetings, and formal 
training events. These presentations include analyst training through the Defense 
Intelligence Agency’s Advanced Counterterrorist Analyst Course, the DHS Basic and 
Mid-level Intelligence Terrorism Analysis Course, and the FBI Basic Analyst Course.  
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the ITACG is working to define the most 
effective means of integrating with state and local fusion centers.170 
According to the July 2010 Information Sharing Environment Annual Report to 
Congress: 
Over the last year the ITACG: 
• Contributed to the publication of approximately 34 Roll Call Releases 
relating to terrorism, homeland security, and WMD threats; 
• Reviewed, provided comments, or proposed language to 403 Intelligence 
Community products prior to publication by the originating agencies; and 
• Requested downgrading of 78 classified Intelligence Community 
products.171 
D. CONCLUSION 
As our government continues to develop the Information Sharing Environment, 
bridging together disparate agencies that seek to protect our nation from terrorism, it is 
increasingly necessary to integrate expertise from all disciplines and levels of 
government to enhance intelligence production, analysis and sharing efforts.  The federal 
government’s model of facilitating the ISE must be further refined to incorporate greater 
collaboration with state and local officials to ensure relevant intelligence is both 
developed for and provided to those in positions to protect the homeland, beyond their 
traditional IC customers.  The ITACG is a relatively new development within the federal 
government that, if integrated appropriately within both the NCTC and national network 
of fusion centers, has the potential to mature and become the much-needed conduit of the 
desired intelligence-sharing continuum.  To date, considering the ITACG’s capabilities  
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and limitations, it has gained considerable ground integrating with the IC and advocating 
for first responders.  The following chapters aim to provide recommendations to enhance 
this much-needed continuum. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS: MAKING FUSION CENTERS WORK 
A fusion center’s effectiveness is dependent on its ability to analyze disparate 
streams of information and consistently share timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence 
that augments the decision-making abilities of a broad group of stakeholders, thereby 
increasing public safety and homeland security. As corroborated from the previous 
analyses, fusion centers are experiencing difficulty satisfying this objective, which is the 
very purpose of their existence.  If working properly, fusion centers will improve the 
overall safety of a state or region by influencing the establishment of proactive, resource-
efficient security strategies in response to threat scenarios.  Ultimately, this requires that 
leadership at fusion centers develop broad-reaching, trusted partnerships for gathering 
information and sharing relevant intelligence; as well as policies and procedures to ensure 
that the processes and guidelines that govern a well-functioning intelligence-sharing 
enterprise become doctrine.  Through the creation of a “megacommunity,” the author 
provides several policy options, triangulated through research, to make fusion centers 
work properly. 
A. THE PUBLIC SAFETY “MEGACOMMUNITY” 
1. Collaboration 
Among the most significant themes corroborated in the analysis of fusion centers 
is their limited collaborative capacity.  Collaboration is essential, as highlighted in the 
tenets of the Fusion Center Guidelines: 
The ultimate goal [of a fusion center] is to provide a mechanism through 
which government, law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector 
can come together with a common purpose and improve the ability to 
safeguard our homeland and prevent criminal activity.…Fusion centers 
embody the core of collaboration, and as demands increase and resources 
decrease, fusion centers will become an effective tool to maximize 
available resources and build trusted relationships.172  
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However, as was apparent from the analyses presented in Chapter V, fostering a 
unified, “team” approach amongst numerous, disparate organizations, and generating the 
capacity to execute a comprehensive strategy is no simple task. Ultimately, collaboration 
involves more than just two-way communications and having partners on the receiving 
end of an information product.  Rather, collaboration requires shared, mutual 
involvement in planning, coordination, decision-making, and operational activities, which 
for statewide or regional purposes, necessitate a more intimate involvement of diverse 
agencies in contributing to the fusion center mission. Most notably, collaboration 
promotes trust, which is essential for effective intelligence production and sharing—a 
requirement verified through the author’s research.  The success of a fusion center 
demands collaboration with a diverse group of government, law enforcement, public 
safety, and private sector agencies to fulfill strategic planning, prioritization, information 
sharing, analysis and intelligence production, as well as threat detection and mitigation 
requirements.  As such, a practicable strategy for each respective center should be the 
initiation and sustainment of a megacommunity.  Executives from Booz Allen Hamilton 
have defined the term megacommunity as “a collaborative socioeconomic environment in 
which business, government, and civil society interact according to their common 
interests, while maintaining their unique priorities.”173 
A common interest among business, government, and civil society is public 
safety. Therefore, the mission of the recommended megacommunity, for example, is to 
provide security to the state or region through the early identification threats, effective 
communication, reduction of vulnerabilities, implementation of effective incident-
response strategies, and the mitigation of risk to ensure overall public safety.  Such a 
mission would be in the best interests of all area businesses and organizations, as each 
requires the aforementioned security attributes for continuity of operations, the promotion 
of a healthy economic environment, and the preservation of a desirable quality of life for 
all citizens. Accordingly, the fusion center would be the primary intelligence 
coordination component within the megacommunity, successfully integrated with all law 
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enforcement, public safety, intelligence, and security entities operating within the area, as 
well as all organizations within the state or region that have a vested interest in security 
and public safety.  Thus, the success of the megacommunity requires a tremendous 
amount of agency/organization buy-in, all must contribute to, understand, and agree to 
the overarching mission and related strategies.  Moreover, each organization must 
conform to their individual roles within the megacommunity and be willing to work 
together collaboratively towards common goals.  For fusion center purposes, this equates 
to the identification of individual megacommunity member intelligence needs; the routine 
delivery of information to the center by all megacommunity entities; megacommunity 
collaboration on information collection strategies and subsequent analyses; and the fusion 
center’s timely delivery of relevant, actionable intelligence to each respective 
megacommunity partner to help support public safety and fulfill the overarching mission.  
Each of the aforementioned requirements was recognized as strongly correlating 
variables in the author’s research triangulation. 
In the initial development of a megacommunity, a core group of existing fusion 
center executives must be selected to serve as ambassadors of the center for outreach and 
marketing purposes.  This group’s primary responsibility should be to execute the role of 
“initiators,” and, thus, move the fusion center—and the megacommunity—from the latent 
stage—where overlapping issues have been recognized, but multi-agency, multi-
discipline collaboration is nonexistent—to the active state of a cross-sector collaborative 
environment.174 This philosophy blends well with suggestions in both the Fusion Center 
Guidelines and the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 
in that it recommends the establishment of a governance board or advisory group to guide 
the strategic planning of the center.175 
Expanding upon the center’s existing partnerships, the initiators must promote 
greater outreach to create a diverse enterprise that focuses on both the overarching and 
unique needs of a broad group of public, private, and government stakeholders within the 
respective state or region.  It is, therefore, recommended that fusion center executives 
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carefully map out the desired megacommunity with a matrix that includes a list of 
potential stakeholders and a description of their interests, objectives, and relationships 
(see Figure 12).176 The resulting matrix can then be used as a guide for all subsequent 
recruiting efforts conducted by the initiation team and, subsequently, to identify and 
document sector- and agency-specific intelligence requirements that enable the center in 
creating niche analysis and reporting for its product line.  The identification of consumer-
specific intelligence requirements was corroborated by the author’s research 
methodologies as a requirement for successful fusion center operations.  
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Figure 12.   Public Safety Megacommunity Stakeholder Matrix 
It is critical that communication during outreach, strategic planning, and all 
ensuing efforts focus on the overlapping vital interests of the prospective 
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megacommunity agencies and organizations; thus, connections must be made between 
their intelligence needs to maintain public safety, security, and operational continuity, 
and the events transpiring locally, nationally, and internationally.177 Accordingly, linking 
local security issues with global trends (such as existing and emerging criminal activity 
trends, natural disasters, and domestic and international terrorist threats) will help to 
stimulate the interests of the identified stakeholders to augment buy-in and participation, 
and enhance their understanding of the underlying mission of the megacommunity, the 
current threat picture, and their application to the state or region.   
This approach will also aid in marketing the fusion center and identifying how it 
can work to satisfy each community member’s intelligence needs.  Furthermore, routine, 
coordinated strategy meetings are necessary to introduce and provide an orientation for 
new participants; maintain trusted relationships and commitments to established 
objectives; collect and discuss feedback from both prior and current engagements; 
address problems, concerns, successes, and lessons learned; and refocus strategies 
according to evolving issues and priorities.  This will provide the collaborate capacity 
required for successful fusion activities. 
2. Capabilities and Limitations 
The author’s research corroborated that fusion center leaders must also work to 
educate their stakeholders of the capabilities and limitations of the center on an ongoing 
basis and provide relevant updates as the center’s human capital grows and additional 
skills sets, technology, and resources are attained.178 Nationally, fusion centers are at 
various stages of development; not all currently have the analytic capabilities, 
technology, or degree of subject-matter expertise available to meet all of the needs of  
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consumers.179 Furthermore, what some consumers may expect from their fusion center 
may not be possible; thus, it is important that consumers not base their expectations on 
unreasonable standards.   
A common misconception about intelligence is that personnel at fusion centers 
should know everything about everything, oftentimes before an event occurs.  This is 
completely false and a misunderstanding of what capabilities truly exist within the 
confines and reach of a fusion center. Intelligence analysts at fusion centers will rarely 
beat the media to a high-profile incident or event; this is not necessarily what intelligence 
is meant to do, and all stakeholders must be educated of this.  However, the by-products 
of intelligence analysis should assist fusion center consumers in avoiding strategic 
surprise and ensure that they are adequately prepared for potential incidents related to 
current threat streams.  Ultimately, the capabilities and limitations of the fusion center 
must be clearly articulated during the initial and subsequent meetings with partner 
agencies and organizations. As capabilities change, partners and consumers must be 
informed and adjustments must be made to existing intelligence priorities, products, and 
processes.   
Additionally, routine meetings with consumers can be used as bilateral 
educational forums to learn the purpose and significance of the various products and 
services that each agency (including the fusion center) can provide, the different analytic 
and industry writing styles and lexicons, and the integral functions of the intelligence, 
law enforcement, public safety, and private and public sector organizations involved in 
the fusion efforts, joined together in the megacommunity.  It is necessary that members of 
the megacommunity work towards the goal of communicating with a common language 
eliminating the opportunity for inconsistencies that contribute to misunderstandings, 
confusion, and improper guidance. This will ultimately lead to a greater understanding of 
each representative’s perspective and objectives, as well as the capabilities and 
                                                 
179 CENTRA Technology, Enhancing DHS Information Support to State and Local Fusion 
Centers: Results of the Chief Intelligence Officer’s Pilot Project and Next Steps (Burlington, MA: February 
2008), 12. 
 86 
limitations of participants.180  Understanding each other’s needs is important for 
sustaining a collaborative environment and maintaining focus on the overlapping 
requirements of the participants.  Most importantly, this will also help foster trust and 
help facilitate the desired continuum of information flowing to and from the fusion center 
and all of its partner agencies and organizations. 
3. Development of Intelligence Liaison Officer Programs 
The author’s research triangulation has verified that the race to collocate 
representatives from numerous agencies within the confines of a fusion center may be 
losing momentum and understandably so. The traditional fusion center design 
emphasizes multi-agency collocation, as placing operational personnel together in the 
same room has been found to accelerate the development of trusted relationships and 
facilitate collaboration.181  However, many agencies and organizations find difficulty 
dedicating limited resources to initiatives that withdraw personnel from their traditional 
assignments.  For example, after 9/11 the resources of local law enforcement agencies 
were stretched thin as they attempted to adapt and manage both traditional anti-crime 
efforts and new anti-terrorism priorities.182  Making matters more difficult, over the 
course of several years, the majority of cities across the U.S. have experienced increasing 
violent crime rates, coupled with decreasing law enforcement staffing capacities.183 As a 
result, agency leaders have expressed concerns regarding the fact that if officers are 
guarding critical infrastructure during heightened security alerts, essential resources may 
not be available to police the streets.184 Continuity of “normal” business operations is a 
fundamental requirement for any organization’s success; therefore, it is critical that those 
resources considered necessary for addressing standard agency needs are able to 
contribute to fusion center priorities without disrupting their normal duties. Nevertheless, 
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while agencies are encouraged to collocate key resources within fusion center facilities to 
meet desired staffing requirements, those that cannot afford to dedicate resources to the 
facility on a full-time basis should not be discouraged from participating in a fusion 
center’s operations. 
It should also be noted that there are logistical challenges that affect collocation.  
It has been realized that many of the fusion center facilities are not large enough to house 
representatives from all agencies, organizations, and sectors that exist within a given state 
or region, nor would this be necessary for the purposes of everyday operations.  
Moreover, providing each representative the required network connectivity to access their 
agency’s data, records management systems, and communications networks can be 
extremely costly and challenging.  Furthermore, due to the sensitivity of the information 
that is routinely handled within each facility (i.e., law enforcement, terrorism, homeland 
security), legal issues exist that put into question the presence of some public and private 
sector personnel within fusion centers, as they cannot legally view certain sensitive or 
personal identifiable information included in most law enforcement information.185 As 
previously indicated, all entities participating in the collaborative environment must 
continue to satisfy their respective agency’s routine priorities. Thus, it is important that 
each representative maintain the ability to continue functioning in their normal capacity 
while providing value to the fusion center and, ultimately, the megacommunity.  
Solutions must be identified that are capable of addressing the aforementioned 
collaboration challenges. 
A means of fulfilling the fusion center–megacommunity concept at the ground 
level is through the implementation of community, interagency, and sector-specific 
liaison officer programs. Such programs have proved to be effective in several states and 
regions, and the author’s research corroborates that great success can be realized through 
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their implementation.186 Liaison officer programs enhance interagency partnerships, 
collaboration, outreach, and “reach-back” capabilities by sponsoring qualified 
representatives from the various agencies and disciplines present within each fusion 
center’s respective state or region, and empowering them to serve as dedicated and vetted 
liaisons between the center, their host agency, and the megacommunity.  Each liaison 
committed to the program should be trained in matters of intelligence, criminology, 
counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, and emergency response and management; 
routinely briefed on current threat streams, as well as the high-risk characteristics of the 
megacommunity’s area; become part of the fusion center’s operations and information 
collection and analysis efforts; and gain access to valuable fusion center resources.  Each 
liaison will ultimately serve as a subject matter expert according to the matters of their 
respective home organization and will develop valuable expertise and a level of 
connectivity that is advantageous to the needs of both the fusion center and the 
organization in which he/she represents.   
In theory, each organization involved in the megacommunity should have at least 
one primary representative to serve in this capacity, depending on the size and 
characteristics of the organization. Their role will be to ensure connectivity and 
communication to and from the fusion center while engaged in operational activities—
whether directed by the fusion center’s priorities or in fulfilling the duties required by 
their home agency.  Accordingly, the liaison will have “both ‘outside-in’ and ‘inside-out’ 
functions,” and the liaison’s agency will benefit from the development of formal and 
informal networks established through participation in the fusion center, as well as the 
larger megacommunity.187 The Department of Homeland Security and Department of 
Justice currently fund training programs, based on agency best practices, to provide the 
liaison officers with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to help fulfill the 
mission of the fusion center and, ultimately, to help enhance the security and mission 
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requirements of the megacommunity.188  Fusion centers should host introductory training 
events for new liaison officers and convene additional trainings and briefings on a routine 
basis (such as quarterly or bi-annually) to reinforce the strength of the network, forge 
stronger interagency relationships, and to educate on the latest threats, information 
systems, and tools available to assist them in facilitating their role. 
The centralization of key assets within the fusion center’s facility, combined with 
the centers connectivity to numerous decentralized hubs established around each 
individual liaison officer, will create a highly effective hybrid network that is conducive 
to the overarching intelligence needs of each organization within the megacommunity.189 
The hybrid network structure will help to eliminate issues related to information 
“stovepiping”, as well as communication “bottlenecks” within the network.  While the 
fusion center will be the main conduit for intelligence coordination and analytic 
resources, the numerous external entities that contribute to the fusion center’s operations, 
acting as force multipliers, will be interlinked to support the megacommunity and, 
ultimately, provide various degrees of support.  
As the fusion center develops intelligence products, the intelligence liaison 
officers within each respective organization will serve as recipients of the product 
disseminations.  Based on liaison officers’ training and understanding of their respective 
organizations, they will determine who within their organization is best suited to be a 
direct recipient of specific intelligence released from the center.  This accomplishes two 
important objectives: first, it ensures that the fusion center is not overloading public 
safety and security personnel with information that is not relative to their operational role, 
ensuring the fusion center remains relevant.  Second, the model streamlines product flow 
to those in the best position to act upon the intelligence provided, as the liaison officers 
will know the inner-workings of their respective agencies better than personnel working 
within the fusion center (see Figure 13).   
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Reversing the information flow of this model proves just as effective because it 
ensures that information collected at the “ground-level” by operational personnel is 
coordinated through the liaison officer and up to the fusion center.  After all, it would be 
counterproductive for information to by-pass the liaison officer to reach the fusion center, 
as this would circumvent the significant need to keep the liaison officer informed of 
relevant events occurring within his or her area of responsibility.  Liaison officers should 
be kept privy of all information of significance and, most importantly, related to the 
intelligence/information requirements and collection priorities identified by the 
megacommunity leadership.  Ultimately, an intelligence-sharing continuum will develop 





Figure 13.   Public Safety Megacommunity190 
B. CONCLUSION 
If fusion centers choose to continue operating in the status quo, there is a 
significant chance that opportunities to identify activity that could affect the safety and 
security of the homeland will be missed.  Therefore, significant focus must be placed on 
building a highly collaborative environment—one that embraces the design of a hybrid 
network and focuses the fusion center’s analysis toward the state or region’s high-risk 
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assets and the needs of its stakeholders.  The recommendations provided in this chapter 
were verified through triangulation as appropriate solutions to promote a desired 
intelligence-sharing continuum.  Each recommendation presents an opportunity for 
significant increases in productivity and efficiency throughout all fusion center 
operations—this will ultimately increase the fusion center’s information and intelligence 
sharing capabilities.  
The “Public Safety Megacommunity” model, coupled with a fusion center’s 
comprehensive use of the intelligence cycle, will ensure that intelligence gaps are 
identified, resources are more effectively and efficiently allocated, all stakeholders’ needs 
are met, and preventive/protective measures are established throughout the state or 
region. The aforementioned model provides a framework to enable information sharing 
and increase a community’s knowledge of its local environment and how it relates to an 
international, geopolitical threat environment; furthermore, it promotes an intelligence-
sharing continuum amongst all entities within the megacommunity. 
While the recommendations provided in this chapter serve to improve fusion 
center operations and make “actionable” the intelligence produced and shared through 
fusion centers to a state and local audience, they are only part of the solution this thesis 
aims to address.  The federal government plays a critical role in ensuring the security of 
the homeland and is a major component of the required intelligence-sharing continuum—
via the NCTC, ITACG, DHS and FBI.  The following chapter will provide 
recommendations to improve these components’ effectiveness based on the (federal 
government’s) intelligence-sharing issues identified in Chapter VI.  
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VIII. IMPROVING THE FEDERAL MODEL: ADVANCING THE 
INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CONTINUUM BY HARNESSING THE 
ITACG  
In today’s asymmetric threat environment, it is imperative that an intelligence-
sharing continuum exists to facilitate a standardized means for handling, analyzing, and 
coordinating terrorism-related information, so that actionable intelligence can be 
provided to empower the decision making of those on the front lines—both domestically 
and abroad.  
The ITACG was created to ensure that relevant intelligence collected at the 
NCTC is shared beyond the Center’s traditional IC consumer base, via DHS and FBI, to 
meet the needs of non-federal public safety officials (via fusion centers). Arguably, the 
ITACG was established to begin implementing the required intelligence-sharing 
continuum.  The NCTC, ITACG, DHS, and FBI are currently working together to 
provide intelligence to fusion centers in a manner that meets their intelligence needs.  
However, the question remains as to whether or not the current model employed by these 
organizations to share, interact, and coordinate with state and local public safety officials 
is working well enough.  Was the implementation of the ITACG into the pre-existing 
model enough to facilitate the required intelligence-sharing continuum?   
Measuring the ITACG’s level of success or failure is relative to ones 
expectations.  The Detail was established in response to a significant gap identified in the 
frequency, quality, timeliness, and relevance of information shared by the IC with state 
and local first responders.  During its initial years, the Detail consisted of no more than 
nine personnel—four of whom were assigned from federal, not local, agencies—each 
tasked with reviewing thousands of highly classified reports for applicability to a state 
and local audience.  In many ways, they served an auditing roll, which left them in a 
position where the state and local community would notice little of their tedious work.  
After a considerable amount of time, the Detail slowly arrived in a position to begin 
contributing to federal intelligence production and developing new resources and product 
lines to meet the needs of state and locals.   
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“The primary mission of the ITACG is to facilitate the production and timely 
issuance of terrorism-related interagency products for distribution to State, Local, Tribal, 
Territorial, and Private Sector [SLTTP] partners, as well as other agencies responsible 
when appropriate,” which relies on the performance of the personnel assigned to the 
Detail, the authority of its leadership, and both cooperation and collaboration of IC 
professionals.191  Currently, the Detail consists of 14 people, which is still a small 
number of personnel to ensure such an important responsibility is fulfilled. Taking into 
account the fact that there are more than 400 federal officials assigned to the NCTC for 
terrorism analysis purposes, how significant of an impact can be expected from such a 
small group of state and local personnel—a group with no authority over the information 
they are reviewing and even less authority to ensure that it is released at a lesser 
classification?  What “results” should be expected from a group that cannot communicate 
the information and analysis it is privy to because of significant—and often justified—
classification and compartmentalization restrictions, as well as protocols restricting the 
Detail from serving as a dissemination mechanism?  
A recent report of the ITACG’s progress states, “Over the last year the ITACG 
contributed to the publication of approximately 250 intelligence products and 37 Roll 
Call Releases relating to terrorism, homeland security, and WMD threats.  With the [new] 
development of a performance management framework, the ITACG Advisory Council 
has set the foundation to create the appropriate performance measures to fully assess the 
ITACG’s progress.”192  For the three and a half years that the Detail has been operating, 
a significant amount of time has been allocated to defining its existence and developing 
the processes that justify its relevance.  Considering the significant challenges to its 
operation, the positive differences the ITACG has made thus far should result in 
significant acknowledgements to those assigned to its operation.  Unfortunately, the 
organization—on its own—will unlikely satisfy the overarching mission requirements for 
which it was intended, due to limitations in its size, authority, and permissible 
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connectivity with state and local officials.  And without greater coordination between the 
ITACG, DHS, and FBI locally (i.e., outside Washington, D.C.), all three entities will 
continue to fail as enablers of the Information Sharing Environment.   
The author provides several recommendations below—each corroborated through 
the applied research methodologies—that may prove effective in establishing the required 
intelligence-sharing continuum between the intelligence community and fusion centers 
by harnessing the ITACG.  The recommendations are intended to: 
1. Facilitate organizational change through empowered leadership; 
2. Foster greater collaboration between intelligence community and fusion 
center personnel;  
3. Link federally-generated intelligence and locally-generated intelligence to 
the requirements of both communities; and 
4. Leverage expertise and vetted resources to streamline a consistent, timely, 
bi-directional delivery of information between the NCTC and fusion 
centers. 
A. MULTI-LEVEL LEADERSHIP 
The author’s research has verified that successful organizational change often 
requires a strategic placement of carefully selected personnel into new leadership 
positions.  If selected internally, the new leaders must be capable of deflecting pressures 
applied by peers that are in opposition to the required organizational change.193  If 
selected externally, they must quickly gain an understanding of the institutional dynamics 
of the organization they will lead in order to deflect these same pressures.  Regardless of 
internal or external selection, new leaders must earn and sustain organizational buy-in to 
ensure a successful transition and provide a clear definition of where the organization is 
intended to go.  As stated by Michael Watkins, a prominent business transition expert, 
“Far too many new leaders…do a poor job of diagnosing their situations and tailoring 
their strategies accordingly”; which can result in bad decisions leading to organization 
transition failures.194 
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In the world of private enterprise, the ITACG’s creation would be considered a 
hybrid of a “startup” and a “sustaining-success situation.”  In a start-up, new leaders are 
“charged with assembling the people, funding, and technology to get a new business, 
product, or project off the ground;” while in a sustaining-success situation, they are 
“shouldering responsibility for preserving the vitality of a successful organization and 
taking it to the next level.”195  Considering the NCTC had been operating with various 
degrees of success for three years, the creation of the ITACG at the NCTC called for a 
careful diagnosis to ensure that the Detail’s implementation strategy fit the existing 
organizational and cultural dynamics of both the NCTC and the IC as a whole.  For the 
first time in U.S. history, the ITACG would bring “outsiders” to a functioning IC 
operation, charged with evaluating and changing existing practices and cultural norms 
that were deeply institutionalized.  Leading such change would not be easy. 
Analysis indicates that since the ITACG’s inception, advocating for the needs of 
state and local agencies within the federally dominated NCTC has proven to be 
challenging.  As stated by an experienced law enforcement practitioner, formerly detailed 
to the ITACG: 
In its current state, the ITACG presents its self as a ‘feel-good’ 
organization that allows state and locals the ability to interact with federal 
information, but does not necessarily provide the organization the 
appropriate means for true collaboration on solutions that advocate for 
state and local interest. Much of this is due to the current leadership 
structure.196   
This is not due to uncooperative personalities or lack of competence but rather the 
culture of the institutions these leaders come from. 
The ITACG Detail’s daily operational leadership consists of a director, who is 
appointed from DHS and a Deputy Director from FBI; there is no leadership position 
representing a state/local organization. While both DHS and FBI have worked hard to 
create strong alliances to support the needs of state and local governments, the current 
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operational model presents a questionable structure to non-federal stakeholders.197  
Expecting the ITACG Detail’s federal leadership to “go to battle” against their own 
agencies in support of the state and local first responder community is an unrealistic 
expectation, as such actions could result in negative repercussions to their careers.  After 
all, the mere concept of the ITACG was seen as controversial to both DHS and FBI to 
begin with, as it was forced upon them by Congressional leaders due to both agencies’ 
perceived incompetence.  As presented in Chapter III, the roles and responsibilities of 
ITACG are focused on complementing and supplementing the existing analytic, 
production, and dissemination efforts by federal entities by: 
• Working with federal analysts to create products for SLTP partners, 
• Providing SLTP perspective to draft intelligence products, 
• Requesting classification downgrades for terrorism-related products 
suitable for first responders, 
• Helping get appropriately classified information to SLTP boots on the 
ground, and 
• Facilitating briefing opportunities for analysts to interact with SLT 
partners.198 
One might argue that DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis was originally 
charged with performing the duties that the ITACG would now be implemented to 
perform, and the FBI had been competing with DHS as a result of the Department’s 
creation—through the Homeland Security Act of 2002—taking some of these same 
responsibilities away from them.  As such, one should not expect the leaders of the Detail 
to push against their home agency in its power struggle while advocating for the 
ITACG’s mission, or lead in a manner that may be seen as competitive or threatening to 
DHS’ or FBI’s perceived “territory.”  The implementation of the ITACG required 
monumental changes in the way that the IC incorporated state and local public safety 
interests as it crafted, compartmentalized, and shared intelligence.  Thus, the assignment 
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of federal officials to lead the ITACG without a state/local official in an equivalent 
position left the operation in a disadvantaged position from the beginning. 
While the ITACG Advisory Council provides the overall strategic direction for 
the organization’s operation, it presents the only state and local perspective to the Detail’s 
leadership.  Fifty percent of the Council’s membership consists of organizations that 
represent state, local, and tribal interests.  Furthermore, those formerly assigned to the 
Detail report that this group is not in touch with the ITACG’s daily operation, as they 
meet semi-annually and function solely as a governance body.199  Those assigned to the 
Detail are afforded opportunities to interact with members of the Council, but without a 
daily presence in the operation, many of the issues the Detail routinely faced went 
unnoticed. 
To improve the ITACG’s potential for success and thereby balance leadership 
decisions with the equities of state and local public safety officials, it is recommended 
that the Detail’s Deputy Director be an appointed state or local official, not a 
representative of the federal government. This recommendation will provide the 
necessary degree of expertise and perspective at the executive level to better influence the 
roles and responsibilities of the Detail’s daily operation at the NCTC.  Candidates should 
be selected by the Advisory Council and may include former state homeland security 
advisors, chiefs, and commissioners from law enforcement and public safety agencies, 
intelligence and investigative commanders, and fusion center directors.  Ultimately, the 
ITACG Detail’s leaders will then include the perspective of an official with significant 
“local” experience working in community the Detail is intended to represent, while 
ensuring they have considerable knowledge of the IC, national security policy, and 
goals/objectives of the Information Sharing Environment.  Perhaps most important, 
unpopular lobbying and decision making against controversial interests of DHS and FBI 
will be far less risky for those in this position, ensuring that politics do not interfere with 
what is required to accomplish the ITACG’s intended mission objectives.   
                                                 
199 Quick, interview by author, June 24, 2010. 
 99 
As another means to advise leadership decisions, those that have served on the 
ITACG Detail should be provided the opportunity to operate in an advisory capacity to 
the ITACG Advisory Council upon their deployment back to their home agency.  Those 
that have served on the Detail can provide great insight regarding the opportunities and 
challenges faced by the Detail in implementing the ITACG mission.  While it would be 
difficult justifying that those formerly assigned to the Detail hold an official position on 
the Advisory Council, it will prove beneficial for them to serve on a working group that 
continues to provide insight to members of the Advisory Council to ensure the ITACG’s 
success. 
B. OVERHAULING THE DIGITAL BACKBONE OF THE CONTINUUM  
Nearly 10 years after 9/11, analysts working at fusion centers are still frustrated 
by the large number of information-sharing systems connecting the intelligence reporting 
produced by the Intelligence Community to that of the national network of fusion centers; 
this issue was corroborated through numerous sources.  Efforts to overhaul DHS’ 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) for unclassified report sharing have 
been slow and arduous. In addition, the deployment of DHS’ classified HSDN terminals, 
while necessary, has proven expensive and risky, while demonstrating various levels of 
success.  Ultimately, more is required to streamline the digital backbone of the required 
intelligence-sharing continuum.  
For matters related to this technological solution, the ITACG is in a valuable, 
strategic position to implement change due to its knowledge of both communities’ 
requirements.  It is, therefore, recommended that the ITACG coordinate with both federal 
and non-federal homeland security partners to finally reduce the number of existing 
information-sharing systems and develop a unified platform for sharing information with 
fusion centers; this will ultimately provide greater efficiency in the reporting of, and 
access to, terrorism-related information.200 Furthermore, the ITACG should work with 
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the IC to develop a robust, consistent, and timely process to deliver information of value 
to these systems; a similar process should be applied by each fusion center. “Real-time” 
linkages, as well as consistent procedures and security policies for information sharing, 
are essential to provide connectivity between those operating within the local 
communities of the U.S. and the IC.201  For counterterrorism purposes, the establishment 
of such a link between fusion centers and the NCTC seems most appropriate. 
Accordingly, the ITACG should be harnessed to ensure such connectivity and 
coordination becomes a reality.  
The ITACG Detail should lead an initiative to provide classified terrorism-related 
information to authorized state and local officials through the NCTC Online secret (NOL-
S) classified, secure Web-portal.  NOL-S has been designed to mirror NCTC Online, 
which is the top-secret information-sharing system that the NCTC uses to share highly-
classified information collected from 28 government networks with federal IC partners 
operating worldwide.202  To avoid further duplication of information-sharing systems 
deployed for state and local use, and, as recommended by those assigned to the Detail, 
DHS, FBI and NCTC should endorse NOL-S as the primary and central repository for 
classified terrorism-related intelligence materials intended for state and local 
consumption.203  While NOL-S is available through existing DHS, FBI, and DOD secret-
level classified information networks, not all fusion centers possess these systems, and, 
therefore, access to this information is not consistently distributed.204 
It is recommended that DHS continue working to expedite the delivery of HSDN 
to all 72 fusion centers to ensure that classified information provided by the ITACG is 
accessible and properly coordinated with state and local officials. Although it should be 
noted that the reception of classified information presents a challenge that is greater than 
just acquiring special equipment, it necessitates strict policy implementation and training 
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on appropriate procedures for the system’s use and subsequent information handling.  To 
date, this has been a significant frustration of fusion center personnel, as those with 
secure terminals and access to HSDN have yet to receive procedural guidance, training 
for the system’s use, or direction on what information exists where within the system and 
how to access it.205  Fusion centers have essentially been left on their own to figure this 
out.  One fusion center director recently stated, “This dilemma is like a waiter at a 
restaurant asking the patrons what they would like to order for dinner, while refusing to 
show them the menu or explain the ‘specials.’”206  Not only should DHS prioritize the 
deployment of HSDN, but also training must be provided to ensure that the equipment is 
used both in accordance with the law and through a means that is most efficient for the 
center (yet another recommendation corroborated through research). This will provide 
state and local personnel with the ability to receive and work with classified information 
at their fusion center, while ensuring that such access does not interfere with active 
investigations or intelligence collection operations.  
Still, however, more must be accomplished to meet the information needs of the 
majority—those state and local officials without secret-level security clearances.  
Unclassified documents produced by the NCTC are routinely posted to top secret 
systems.207  Consequently, this practice renders the products inaccessible by those 
without a security clearance and, ultimately, “over-classifies” the information. As 
previously mentioned, unclassified information distribution by the IC has historically 
been an unorganized process that has resulted in the formation of redundant systems and 
confusion and frustration by those on the receiving end.  
It is recommended that the ITACG coordinate with DHS and FBI on the 
distribution of all unclassified terrorism-related information to one secure portal: the 
Homeland Security—State and Local Intelligence Community (HS-SLIC). This will 
ensure that the information is easily accessible by fusion center personnel for integration 
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into threat and risk assessments, analyses, and for prompt disseminated to appropriate 
partners.  Fusion center directors, via the National Fusion Center Association, have been 
working to establish policies and procedures to govern a secure and confident exchange 
of information through this portal.208  Furthermore, the directors have indicated that they 
would like this to be the primary portal used for these purposes.209  The author’s research 
has corroborated that incorporating the ITACG’s contributions to the Information Sharing 
Environment via HS-SLIC will further-enable the intelligence-sharing continuum 




Figure 14.   ITACG Coordinated Dissemination210  
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The ITACG’s federal and non-federal partners should guide and support the 
Detail in initiatives to overhaul the content and design of NOL-S and HSIN-SLIC to help 
make certain that both sites work to the likings of federal, state, and local officials.  The 
ITACG should conduct outreach and awareness campaigns to promote the use of these 
systems, gain feedback for their design, and provide direction in their use.  Furthermore, 
it is recommended that the ITACG work with DHS and FBI to ensure that their 
headquarters, field offices, and deployed personnel are trained accordingly, abide by new 
coordination policy, and post relevant products to NOL-S and HS-SLIC accordingly, thus 
ensuring consistency and preventing information “stove piping” within disparate systems.  
The ITACG should continue to work with state and local officials to gain an even greater 
understanding of their individual intelligence requirements and experiences working with 
federal agencies to ensure that the organization’s efforts to overhaul the digital backbone 
of the continuum will fulfill the needs of the community that they are advocating for.211  
C. ENHANCING HUMAN CAPITAL: PHASE 2, POST-DETAIL 
DEPLOYMENT  
From a strategic perspective, our government has failed to sustain the expertise 
gained by those that complete their ITACG detail at the NCTC.  Research indicates that 
the current model sends those that have completed their assignment at the ITACG Detail 
back to their home agency without agreements for future roles and responsibilities that 
include them in national security positions.212  While assigned to the Detail, state and 
local officials are engaged in an environment that raises their knowledge of national 
security policies and procedures and provides first-hand experience in the U.S. 
government’s international counterterrorism operations.  This experience should be 
leveraged to improve local coordination of counterterrorism efforts and, ultimately, to 
increase the national security human capital at fusion centers. 
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Assessment and Coordination Group: Report for the Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 
2008), 8–11. 
212 Quick, interview by author, June 24, 2010. 
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As “Phase 2” of the ITACG’s deployment, it is recommended that upon 
completion of individuals’ one-year assignments to the NCTC, they return to the home 
agency as a local representative of the ITACG and a liaison to the NCTC.  During their 
Phase 2 deployment, local ITACG representatives should serve as both terrorism and 
Intelligence Community subject-matter experts, which will prove to be an invaluable 
resource to fusion centers, considering that most centers are lead and staffed by state and 
local officials with limited exposure to the IC.  The local ITACG representatives will be 
strategically prepared to drive collection efforts, train intelligence liaison officers, and 
advocate for the information needs of both the IC and the local public safety community. 
As of May 2011, 73 intelligence officers from DHS have been deployed to fusion 
centers to support their respective missions.213  One of their main assignments is drafting 
Homeland Information Reports (HIRs), which are based on information derived locally 
that supports DHS’ intelligence collection requirements.  HIRs are most frequently 
generated from patterns of criminal activity identified in police reports, intelligence cases 
and investigations.  Concurrently, FBI analysts working in the local field office’s Field 
Intelligence Groups (FIGs) are tasked with analyzing and reporting on their “domain,” or 
area of responsibility according to both jurisdiction and threat analysis, to drive 
intelligence collection and support active investigations.  Presently, little coordination 
occurs between DHS and FBI personnel while they report on their respective agency’s 
intelligence requirements, which are, more often than not, interrelated.   
To remedy this issue, it is recommended that local ITACG representatives are 
tasked to work in close collaboration with both DHS and FBI personnel to ensure that 
information collected domestically that meets national security requirements is identified, 
articulated, and coordinated between both agencies and the fusion center and, ultimately, 
the ITACG Detail. Collaboration with the local FBI field office is a strict requirement, as 
this will ensure that sensitive investigative case information is not improperly released.  
Using consistently applied protocols, information should be delivered to the ITACG for 
further integration with IC reporting; hence, harnessing the ITACG to push information 
                                                 
213 Johnson, “Status of Efforts to Support Increased Capacity.” 
 105 
to the IC, instead of just to pull information from it.  Local ITACG representatives should 
leverage NOL-S via the fusion center’s HSDN system and HS-SLIC to move locally 
generated information of relevance to the attention of the ITACG, which, in turn, can 
correlate the information with locally-generated information from other fusion centers 
and inform the NCTC of patterns and trends in local activity (see Figure 15).  This 
positive organizational change to a bi-directional give-and-take methodology—rather 
than the existing one-way take methodology—will help the IC better understand the 
value of the state and local community in support of global counterterrorism efforts and, 
eventually, lead to greater collaboration. 
 
Figure 15.   ITACG Local Collection and IC Integration Model214 
                                                 
214 Quick, “Production, Dissemination, and Feedback.” 
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1. Extending Joint-Duty: Integrating Elements from Both Sides of the 
Continuum to Enhance Knowledge, Skills and Abilities 
Leaders within the IC tend to be skilled in their respective fields of expertise; 
however, their ability to provide the best solutions is often blocked by the boundaries of 
their institutional culture and prerogatives.215  Senior IC leaders require a broad, 
enterprise-wide focus that provides a deep understanding of how each agency and 
element of the IC contributes to the overall counterterrorism mission.216  In an effort to 
promote better teamwork among IC agencies and to develop leaders with the ability to 
integrate all of the IC assets to accomplish this mission, the Joint Duty Program was 
passed into law fulfilling one of the key elements of the 2004 IRTPA.  In short, Joint 
Duty requires intelligence officials to spend time working at another intelligence agency 
before they can be considered for senior-level promotions, providing leadership with 
knowledge and experience outside the institutional boundaries of their home agency.217  
According to former DNI Dennis Blair, “When the next generation of intelligence leaders 
moves into the top jobs, their experience will make them better joint leaders….They will 
instinctively pool their skills and capabilities.”218 
Joint Duty is currently limited to the Intelligence Community’s personnel; 
meanwhile, the national network of fusion centers has emerged, requiring consistent 
interaction with several elements of the IC.  Fusion center personnel have begun short 
term “joint duty” engagements of their own to learn about the operations of other fusion 
centers and share best practices and experiences; this has been administered through the 
DOJ/DHS Fusion Center Exchange Program.  The author’s research has corroborated 
that this program has become a highly sought after as a rich learning experience for front-
line personnel and executives alike.  Unfortunately, few programs are available allowing 
                                                 
215 Dennis Blair, “Luncheon Keynote Address” (presented to State of Intelligence Reform 
Conference, Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, D.C., April 6, 2010), 
http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/news/multimedia/2010/04/07/videos-447 (accessed August 14, 2011). 
216 Mike McConnell, “Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program Implementing 
Instructions,” in Intelligence Community Policy Guidance Number 601.01 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, 2007). 
217 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 
218 Blair, “Luncheon Keynote Address.” 
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such an exchange between fusion center and IC personnel.  While fusion centers may 
never be considered a node of the IC, their relevance in regards to the U.S. national 
security mission and the Information Sharing Environment, demands a seamless, 
coordinated partnership with the IC.  Thus, consideration should be given to the inclusion 
of fusion center personnel in the IC’s Joint Duty Program (see Figure 16).  The ITACG’s 
creation may be considered a positive step forward in seeing that this becomes a reality, 
as it currently facilitates a similar role. 
 
Figure 16.   Intelligence Community with SLTT Joint Duty Participation219 
Research has verified the need for training and education within the IC to raise 
awareness of the counterterrorism operations developing within state and local 
governments and to determine how the IC and fusion centers can augment each other’s 
mission requirements.  The ITACG’s creation was intended to help IC personnel think 
differently when conducting analysis and writing products, mostly due to the IC’s historic 
inability to write intelligence to a state and local audience.  IC agencies have traditionally 
written intelligence at the highest classification level; there has never existed a 
requirement or incentive to write at the Unclassified-level.220  ITACG personnel have 
worked closely with federal analysts assigned to the Detail to cross-train and augment 
their writing styles and educate on what information is of most value to the local public 
                                                 
219 Graphic adapted from Pile, “Overview of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.” 
220 Quick, interview with author, June 24, 2010. 
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safety community.  To help promote this level of cross training beyond the Detail, and to 
begin promoting a greater awareness of fusion centers, the ITACG should develop a 
training program for personnel at IC training academies.  The training program should 
focus on the relationship between the operations of state and local law enforcement and 
public safety officials and that of the IC.  Significant emphasis should be applied toward 
writing intelligence products at multiple tiers of classification and to the needs of various 
stakeholders to ensure that elements of their intelligence reporting can reach the local 
audience.  Additionally, participants should be educated on the operations of fusion 
centers, their capabilities and limitations, and how they fit into their counterterrorism 
mission.   
IC analysts with relevant national security responsibilities should rotate in and out 
of both the ITACG Detail and fusion centers as part of the IC’s joint duty program.  This 
should be an element for consideration in an IC analyst’s career track and an additional 
reinforcement for one’s promotion. The experience gained will provide IC personnel 
opportunities to learn the requirements of state and local officials by actively 
participating in a fusion center operation. Ultimately, this provides an environment where 
both state and local officials and IC personnel can learn tradecraft from each other that is 
beneficial to the broad range of national security requirements.   
5. Joint Duty Case Study: Boston ODNI RASER Team 
In 2007 and 2008, ODNI deployed small groups of IC personnel on joint duty 
training assignments at various national security and law enforcement organizations as 
part of its Rapid Analytic Support and Expeditionary Response program (known as 
“RASER Teams”).  According to the ODNI, “RASER [was] a program to create 
multidisciplinary teams of Intelligence Community (IC) analysts trained and equipped 
with the leadership skills, analytic tools, tradecraft, and mission processes to meet 
complex analytic challenges. The teams test innovative analytic training, tools, and 
tradecraft that can be applied to improve and bolster existing processes and tools.”221 
                                                 
221 Office of the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, Analytic Transformation: 
Unleashing the Potential of a Community of Analysts (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2008), 14. 
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The RASER program was an experiment to test a hypothesis that special joint 
training and development can compress the learning that normally requires many years 
for analysts to accomplish via traditional training and assignments into a single year.222 
The Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), the Metro-Boston Region’s fusion 
center, was one of the locations in which teams were deployed.  From a fusion center 
perspective, this program provided a positive experience for IC and fusion center 
personnel alike: 1.) It offered an opportunity for cross-discipline training that was 
otherwise absent from fusion center operations, and otherwise unavailable to fusion 
center personnel.  The RASER Team provided personnel training in intelligence analysis 
and collection tradecraft; intelligence cycle implementation and procedural guidance; and 
worked hand-in-hand with fusion center analysts assessing emerging threats and 
producing intelligence on risks within the BRIC’s area of responsibility.223  2.) In return, 
the IC personnel from the RASER Team were afforded an opportunity to assist a non-
Federal, criminal intelligence and investigative operation; they experienced firsthand how 
the information collected by the IC applies to fusion center operations and helps to 
inform state and local government risk mitigation strategies; and they learned how a lack 
of coordination amongst IC agencies interacting with fusion centers can negatively affect 
analyses and investigations.224 
The extension of the Joint Duty Program should provide inter-agency exchange 
opportunities for both IC and fusion center personnel alike.  It is recommended that 
fellowship opportunities become available for fusion center personnel to work not only at 
the ITACG, but also within agencies of the IC to gain a broader perspective of 
international counterterrorism operations. The fellowships model should allow time for 
analytic tradecraft development, education, and collaboration on projects that enhance 
both communities’ understanding of each other’s mission requirements.  This will expose 
fusion center personnel to new analytic methodologies and subject matter, making them 
stronger analysts upon their return to the fusion center.   
                                                 
222 Office of the Deputy Director, Analytic Transformation, 14. 
223 Experience of author. 
224 Experience of author. 
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In 2008, the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the 
Harvard Kennedy School selected the IC’s Joint Duty Program as a winner of the 2008 
Innovations in American Government Awards. The program was recognized for 
promoting cross collaboration and knowledge transfer across the entire Intelligence 
Community. As one of six winners, the program received $100,000 toward dissemination 
and replication across the country.225  Opportunities such this should be leveraged to 
supplement the funding required to extend this program to fusion centers.  Furthermore, 
the Technical Assistance Program offered through DHS and DOJ may provide an 
additional resource for sponsorship, providing the financial and logistical assistance 
needed to execute this recommendation. 
Implementation of this recommendation may resolve a significant issue that has 
obstructed the ITACG’s ability to succeed, as fusion center personnel deployed to the IC 
through the Joint Duty Program will serve as force-multipliers to the ITACG Detail.  
Where the Detail has been limited is size and reach, fusion center personnel participating 
in joint duty will mitigate this issue by extending elements of the ITACG’s operation 
deeper into the IC, while providing a unique, local analytical perspective.  Moreover, the 
knowledge and experience gained through this infusion of local personnel into the IC will 
subsequently contribute additional, qualified personnel to fulfill the responsibilities of the 
recommended ITACG Phase 2 deployments at fusion centers.  Ultimately, a sustainable 
cycle of subject-matter expertise will emerge and proliferate the intelligence-sharing 
continuum (see Figure 17). 
                                                 
225 “Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program Honored as Innovations in American 
Government Award Winner,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence Public Affairs Office, 
September 9, 2008, www.dni.gov/press_releases/20080910_release.pdf (accessed April 15, 2011).  
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Figure 17.   Public Safety Megacommunity with Enhanced Fusion Center226 
D. CONCLUSION 
Nearly 10 years after 9/11, the federal government still requires a more effective 
means to ensure that terrorism-related information generated globally is analyzed and 
shared with the National Network of Fusion Centers and the local public safety 
communities they serve in order to assist in the formulation of risk mitigation strategies.  
Furthermore, better inter-agency coordination is required between DHS’ and FBI’s 
domestic operations to reduce duplicative efforts and foster collaborative relationships; 
and more efficient protocols are required to streamline the flow of locally generated 
intelligence, collected at fusion centers, with members of the IC.  Triangulating the 
                                                 
226 “Enhanced Fusion Center” includes greater federal agency coordination via ITACG Post-
Detail Deployment, Intelligence Community Joint Duty Detailee, DHS I&A, and FBI FIG. 
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results of several research methodologies corroborated these requirements.  Furthermore, 
through the application of this research methodology, the author has provided the 
following recommendations to promote the required intelligence-sharing continuum by 
harnessing the ITACG: 
• Recommendation: Appoint a state or local government representative to 
the position of Deputy Director of the ITACG Detail. 
• Outcome: Provide a representative leadership structure and thereby ensure 
that politics related to DHS and FBI do not interfere with what is required 
to accomplish the ITACG’s intended mission objectives. 
• Recommendation: Recruit those that previously served on the ITACG 
Detail to serve and report in an advisory capacity to the ITACG Advisory 
Council.  
• Outcome: Provide greater insight regarding the frequent challenges and 
opportunities for the Detail’s operation. 
• Recommendation: Leverage the experiences, perspectives and mission of 
the ITACG to reduce, overhaul, and streamline the existing electronic 
systems used to share classified and unclassified information with state 
and local partners. 
• Outcome: Consistent, reliable, and faster access to relevant federally-
generated intelligence. 
• Recommendation: Expedite the delivery of DHS’ Homeland Security Data 
Network to all 72 fusion centers and provide training to all system users 
on site contents, portal navigation, and appropriate use procedures. 
• Outcomes:   
• Establish capability to receive secret-level classified intelligence 
consistently at all fusion centers;  
• Support effective use of classified systems by state and local 
intelligence practitioners; and 
• Provide reliable, faster access to relevant classified federal 
intelligence. 
• Recommendation: Continue working towards a greater frequency of tear 
line, unclassified intelligence reporting.  
• Outcomes:   
• Provide a consistent, timely, actionable stream of intelligence to 
state and local law enforcement and public safety officials; and 
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• Ensure current trends related to terrorist activity remain relative to 
the first responder community. 
• Recommendation: Implement a “Phase 2” ITACG Detail deployment 
strategy to institutionalize specific Detail operational requirements at 
fusion centers.  
• Outcomes:  
• Appropriately coordinate locally derived information with fusion 
center personnel, locally deployed DHS assets, and FBI field 
offices; 
• Establish local counterterrorism and IC experts and liaisons to the 
NCTC; and 
• Facilitate the delivery of relative fusion center generated 
intelligence to the Intelligence Community via the ITACG Detail 
and the NCTC. 
• Recommendation: Institute processes and procedures that harness the 
ITACG Detail to better coordinate to reception of fusion center generated 
intelligence at the NCTC.  
• Outcome: Provide a means to facilitate the collection, collation, and 
analysis of locally-derived intelligence, in coordination with the NCTC, to 
identify regional, national, and international patterns of emerging activity. 
• Recommendation: Expand the Intelligence Community’s Civilian Joint 
Duty Program to fusion centers. 
• Outcomes:   
• Promote short-term detail opportunities for IC professionals at 
fusion centers; 
• Provide short-term detail opportunities for fusion center personnel 
at IC agencies; 
• Develop cross-disciplinary and cross-governmental training; and 
• Improve IC knowledge of fusion center requirements and fusion 
center awareness of IC requirements. 
The desired continuum requires support from the top levels of leadership capable 
of defying boundaries created by Cold War mentalities and organizational culture. Our 
nation’s 72 fusion centers are at a loss without the aid of a national intelligence support 
structure capable of providing timely and actionable terrorism-related intelligence that 
includes the IC’s international perspective.  However, the mere delivery of generic 
intelligence is not enough. Similar to the model presented in Chapter VII, the Federal 
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government must harness the requirements of its newest stakeholders—the National 
Network of Fusion Centers—through greater interaction and collaboration.  The ITACG 
is in a unique position to provide expertise and continue coordination efforts beyond the 
confines of the NCTC, extending their services to fusion centers.  Leveraging technology 
as a means to facilitate intelligence-sharing, and personnel from the ITACG Detail to 
provide the voice of state and local officials, the desired intelligence-sharing continuum 
will emerge, capable of facilitating the flow of timely, actionable intelligence with all 






Figure 18.   Recommended Model with Intelligence-Sharing Continuum227 
                                                 
227 Intelligence Community graphic adapted from Pile, “Overview of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence.”  
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APPENDIX DELPHI PANEL 
A. DELPHI PANEL: QUESTIONNAIRE 1 FEBRUARY 13, 2008 
For the questions below, list as many factors as you feel necessary, providing a 
brief explanation of the importance of each factor.  Your insights regarding “best 
practices” and/or negative factors will be important to this survey.   
1. To the best of your knowledge, are most intelligence and information 
consumers228 satisfied with the current standard of products and services 
provided by state and local fusion centers?  Why or Why Not? 
2. List the major factors that are affecting information and intelligence 
production at fusion centers (e.g., leadership, collaboration, subject 
matter expertise, human capital, relevance of analysis). 
3. List significant factors, practices, and/or processes that would help fusion 
centers generate relevant information/intelligence products and service 
(e.g., Is the intelligence received making a difference? Your intelligence 
requirements, feedback, success stories.). 
4. List the major factors that currently affect information flow between: 
a. The Federal Intelligence Community and fusion centers 
b. Domestic information/intelligence collectors229 and fusion centers 
c. Fusion centers and the consumers of fusion center-generated 
products and services 
(e.g., Who do you think is in charge of domestic intelligence? Is the intelligence 
making it to the street? Classification of information, effectiveness of “write for 
release” practices, classification network domains; need for HSINT doctrine, 
definitions of HSINT). 
5. List significant factors, practices, and/or processes that would positively 
influence the flow of information between: 
a. The Federal Intelligence Community and fusion centers 
b. Domestic information/intelligence collectors and fusion centers 
c. Fusion centers and the consumers of fusion center-generated 
products and services 
                                                 
228 Information/Intelligence Consumers:  Federal, state, local, tribal, private, and public sector 
policy makers, managers, agencies and organizations that are supported by the analysis, products and 
services provided by state and local fusion centers. 
229 Domestic Information/Intelligence Collectors:  Individuals employed by state, municipal and 
tribal law enforcement agencies; private security agencies; non-traditional intelligence collection agencies 
such as fire and EMS, municipal and state code inspection agencies, transportation agencies, public health 
and public service agencies; business organizations; and the public. 
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(e.g., unify the federal HSINT product through one agency or group, increase 
constructive dialogue with federal intelligence providers, ensure state/local fusion 
center intelligence is provided to federal stakeholders, success stories). 
6. Any other factors you care to address: 
B. DELPHI PANEL: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES PROVIDED FOR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 1 MARCH 16, 2008 
1. To the best of your knowledge, are most intelligence and information 
consumers satisfied with the current standard of products and 
services provided by state and local fusion centers?  Why or Why 
Not? 
15 respondents stated that consumers are not satisfied: 
• Lack of analysis and value added in products (substandard products) 
• Low value added affects consumer views of SLFC 
• Too much cutting and pasting 
• Circular reporting 
• Publishing products to show they are doing something 
• Most of what is disseminated can be found in the news/media 
• Information not properly sourced 
• Receiving one-size-fits-all products 
• Not meeting consumer requirements 
• Consumers are not defining requirements 
• Lack requisite info, Intel, sources to meet consumers’ needs 
• Information delivery lacks timeliness 
• Ad hoc delivery/dissemination chains 
• Consumers don’t know how to interpret the products 
• Little private sector participation 
• Fusion centers are not identifying priorities and developing collection 
plans 
• Lack of planning in development of SLFCs 
• Producers are still developing necessary skills and processes for 
production 
• LE sensitive reports are not reaching non-LE partners 
• Disconnect between IC and LE communities 
 119 
• Consumers not aware of what SLFCs can provide 
• SLFCs still trying to figure out their roles 
5 stated that consumers are satisfied: 
• However, consumers would like to see more products with local relevance 
• However, consumers would like to see increased efforts for collocation to 
increase participation 
• Agencies happy to be assisting SLFCs on terrorism related issues 
2 stated that they were not sure why. 
2. List the major factors that are affecting information and intelligence 
production at fusion centers. 
Lack of subject matter expertise: 
• Lack of human capital in analysts 
• Can’t retain the highly trained 
• Lack of experience 
• Lack of analytic experience 
• Over-tasking w/ different assignments and roles leads to jack of all trades, 
rather than an expert in a particular area 
• Lack of analytic training and skill development 
Lack of leadership/leadership issues: 
• Lack of knowledge re: Intelligence 
• Lack of understanding regarding the value of analysis 
• Lack modern organizational vision 
• Lack leadership training 
• Lack of political commitment help build and sustain FCs 
• Ineffective leadership 
Shortage in personnel depth:  
• Can’t hire enough personnel to meet expectations/demands 
• Staffing restraints 




Problems with Collaboration: 
• Turf wars 
• Issues with co-location 
• Lack of partnerships through personal contact 
• Lack of sharing of resources, personnel, decision making, accountability 
Tactical vs. Strategic analysis emphasis: 
• Lack of strategic focus 
• Conflicting intelligence focus areas 
• Operational support has overtaken strategic analysis 
Problems w/ technology: 
• Database capabilities 
• Information sharing capabilities 
• Lack of tools 
Lack of information sharing: 
• Within State and amongst state, local, and federal partners 
• Classified materials 
• Lack of knowledge regarding how to handle classified materials 
• Lack of declassification—too much over-classification 
• Affecting joint-production 
3. List significant factors, practices, and/or processes that would help 
fusion centers generate relevant information/intelligence products and 
services. 
Leadership must: 
• Develop strong, active, lasting relationships with partner agencies from all 
levels of government, as well as the private and public sectors. 
• Clearly articulate to consumers the capacity of the fusion center and 
ensure that consumer expectations do not exceed the fusion center’s 
capabilities. 
• Partake in greater marketing and outreach programs by publicizing their 
mission, and sharing success stories and best practices. 
• Set strategic priorities, planning and direction, and ensure that all 
processes and practices are in accordance with the intelligence cycle. 
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• Obtain a greater balance between tactical and strategic product 
development/priorities, etc. 
• Collaborate nationally to develop baseline capabilities for fusion centers 
(operational standards). 
Intelligence Requirements—Fusion Centers must: 
• Set clear, concise intelligence requirements, and develop effective means’ 
of adjusting requirements according to their evolving needs.  
• Fusion centers must focus collection priorities according to the 
intelligence requirements of their consumers.  
• Develop better product/service evaluation and feedback mechanisms must 
be developed so that fusion center product development can stay on point 
with the evolving needs of consumers. 
Training and Education: 
• Fusion centers must develop career intelligence professionals. 
• Personnel must be properly trained and educated, and given the time to 
gain experience and develop greater analytic skill. 
• Leadership must be properly trained, strategically focused, and 
experienced with the intelligence profession. 
Miscellaneous: 
• Fusion centers must enhance partnerships and outreach capabilities 
through community, interagency, and sector-specific liaison officer 
programs.  
• Fusion center personnel need access to timely and relevant unclassified 
information from the IC that can be applied to their analysis and products. 
• Fusion centers need better technology to help facilitate collection, 
analysis, dissemination, and knowledge management.  
4. List the major factors that currently affect information flow between 
the Federal Intelligence Community and fusion centers; domestic 
information/intelligence collectors and fusion centers; and fusion 
centers and the consumers of fusion center-generated products and 
services. 
Information Classification: 
• Information is being over-classified. 
• Affects ability of analysts to use information provided by feds. 
• Access to classified materials is useless—information cannot be shared 
with front line personnel.  
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• Challenges accessing classified systems (fusion centers).  
• Issues with the laws and policies that regulate the handling and 
dissemination of SBU information. 
Trust/Collaboration: 
• Lack of trust has led to insufficient collaboration between the IC and 
fusion centers. 
• Fusion centers are not comprehensively included in the national 
intelligence system. 
• Lack of collaboration between DHS and FBI creates an obstacle for 
information flow. 
• A competitive atmosphere, territoriality, and interagency rivalries are 
inhibiting information sharing between agencies and fusion centers. 
• No clear model for how disparate agencies can work together 
collaboratively on intelligence operational endeavors. 
• Absence of routine meetings between fusion center leadership and 
consumers for strategic planning; to enhanced relationships and 
collaboration. 
• The private and public sectors are not adequately engaged in fusion center 
efforts. 
Information Network Efficacy: 
• Too many information-sharing networks at the national/federal level. 
• Absence of standardized, formal reporting mechanisms for the timely 
exchange of information between the IC and fusion centers. 
• Insufficient technology for knowledge management and the sharing of 
data, information, and intelligence. 
Intelligence Requirements:  
• Strategic priorities at fusion centers are not adequately focused, leading to 
collection efforts that are dissimilar to consumer requirements. 
• Limited outreach and marketing of fusion center intelligence requirements 
and production capabilities. 
• Lack of focused, efficient collection efforts at the state and local level 
• Fusion centers have not identified and shared their intelligence 





• Products created at the federal level lack relevance to state and local 
needs. 
• There is a lack of education, training, and experience with intelligence 
outside the federal echelon. 
• Unclear as to who is leading fusion center and domestic intelligence 
endeavors. 
• Limited personnel available at fusion centers to provide outreach and 
marketing of priorities and capabilities. 
• Inadequate feedback and follow-up mechanisms to identify the usefulness 
of information provided to fusion centers. 
5. List significant factors, practices, and/or processes that would 
positively influence the flow of information between the Federal 
Intelligence Community and fusion centers; domestic 
information/intelligence collectors and fusion centers; and fusion 
centers and the consumers of fusion center-generated products and 
services. 
Create National Strategy for Fusion Centers: 
• Create a national strategy for fusion centers that articulates their role and 
position amongst law enforcement and intelligence agencies at all levels of 
government. 
• Define the role of DHS representatives within the fusion centers, and then 
identify how this role, as well as fusion center access to classified 
material, is an asset beyond the confines of the fusion center.  
• The federal government must provide a clear vision of how fusion centers 
fit into the intelligence community, and then fund it accordingly. 
• Implement policy change and promote cultural change that facilitates and 
encourages information sharing across all agencies, disciplines, and 
sectors. 
Focus on Intelligence Requirements:  
• Fusion centers must articulate clear, concise, relevant intelligence 
requirements, and the IC must meet those requirements with products 
tailored to meet their needs. 
• Prioritize intelligence requirements and lead strategically focused 
collection efforts that meet the needs of consumers; limit general 
requirements 




• Unification in the messages sent from the IC to fusion centers.  
• DHS and FBI (as well as other agencies) must collaborate on join-
products to close gaps and provide “one federal voice”.  
• Stronger partnerships, collaborations, and trust amongst IC and fusion 
center agencies; no more “us” vs. “them.” 
• Develop stronger interagency relationships through greater partnerships, 
collaborations, trust, and the ability to collocate to establish personal 
contact. 
• Implement more liaison officer programs to facilitate communication and 
collaboration amongst agencies, disciplines, and sectors. 
Fusion Center Management and Marketing: 
• Develop efficient feedback and follow-up mechanisms to identify the 
usefulness of information provided to both fusion centers and consumers. 
• Share success stories and best practices to build trust and confidence. 
• Greater outreach and marketing of fusion center mission, intelligence 
requirements; explain what the fusion center does, capabilities, limitations, 
and what the consumer can provide the fusion center. 
• Establish standardized, formal reporting mechanisms and dissemination 
protocols for the timely, efficient exchange of information between fusion 
centers, agencies, and front line personnel.  
Enhance and Streamline Information Systems/Networks:  
• Consolidate the federal information sharing systems and create a single 
location for gathering federal information and posting RFIs, IIRs, etc.  
• Better technology for information sharing: systems/portals where data, 
crime bulletins, IIRs, RFIs, etc. can be posted and shared with all partner 
agencies within a state or region 
• Standardize the technology so that systems can be interlinked to facilitate 
exchange nationally. 
Prioritize Training and Education: 
• Proper training amongst federal, state, and local agencies regarding each 
agencies mission space, how to work together more effectively, and the 
relevance of certain topics at each level of government.  




Fix Information Classification Issues: 
• More de-classification, write-for-release, and tear line reporting that 
information can be shared beyond the fusion center. 
• Create standards for “Sensitive but Unclassified” information so that it can 
be easily shared, yet adequately protected.  
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